Unregulated Investment in Certain Death: SEC v. Life Partners, Inc. by Davis, Michael R.
Volume 42 Issue 3 Article 4 
1997 
Unregulated Investment in Certain Death: SEC v. Life Partners, Inc. 
Michael R. Davis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael R. Davis, Unregulated Investment in Certain Death: SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 42 Vill. L. Rev. 925 
(1997). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss3/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1997]
Notes
UNREGULATED INVESTMENT IN CERTAIN DEATH:
SEC v. LIFE PARTNERS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past eight years a new financial service has developed that
offers terminally-ill persons-most frequently acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS) patients in their final six months to two years of life-
access to potentially enormous financial resources.' This new financial
service simultaneously offers large and small investors the opportunity to
reap tremendous investment returns.2 This service has come to be known
as viatical settlement.3
1. See Keith Stone, Brokers, Terminally Ill Turning Death Into Cash, L.A. DILY
NEWS, Oct. 25, 1992, at NI. Stone explained that "[s~ince the first viatical settle-
ment company opened in 1988, nearly 30 more have begun doing business in a
market that industry officials predict will expand." Id. Stone's prediction was cor-
rect as the viatical settlement industry has continued to grow, surpassing $200 mil-
lion per year in 1995, with projected growth to a more than $1 billion per year
industry within the next decade. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Tackling an Issue of Agony;
Ruling May Ultimately Aid the Business of Buying Death Benefits, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,
1995, at COI; see also SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1995)
(explaining growth of viatical settlement industry), remanded by 87 F.3d 536 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Shanah D. Glick, Comment, Are Viatical Settlements Securities Within the
Regulatory Control of the Securities Act of 1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 957, 957 (1993)
(recognizing financial resources that viatical settlements provide for terminally-ill
AIDS patients).
2. See Glick, supra note 1, at 957-58 (explaining innovative methods through
which individual investors have taken advantage of opportunities presented by viat-
ical settlements in recent years); see also Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI (explaining
advantages that investments in viatical settlements offer individual investors);
Stone, supra note 1, at NI (recognizing morbidity and potential high-return invest-
ment in viatical settlements represent).
3. See Stone, supra note 1, at NI. The concept embodied in what has come to
be known as viatical settlement has been given many names, however, viatical set-
tlement is the most common and has gained the most widely accepted usage. See
id. This term has two Latin origins. See id. The term originated in the Latin word
"viaticum," referring to money provided for ajourney. See id. This Latin term lent
its name to the Roman Catholic sacrament administered to an individual who is in
danger of dying. See id. In the late 1980s, and throughout the 1990s, this term has
been associated with the practice of purchasing terminally-ill individuals' life insur-
ance policies. See id.; see also SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (discussing viatical settlement as investment contract through which inves-
tors purchase interests in life insurance policy of terminally-ill individuals); Glick,
supra note 1, at 957 (referring to practice of purchasing terminally-ill individuals'
life insurance policies as "viatical settlement"); John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sar-
noff, Viatical Settlements: Another Form of Unregulated Investment, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 15,
1996, at 3 (defining viatical settlment as process whereby third party purchases
interest in life insurance policy of terminally-ill individual at discount to face value
(925)
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In a viatical settlement, a terminally-ill insured typically transfers own-
ership of his or her life insurance policy to a buyer for a one-time lump-
sum payment.4 This payment is usually equal to sixty to eighty-five percent
of the face value of the life insurance policy. 5 The buyer maintains the
policy, becomes the named beneficiary of the policy and collects a return
on his or her investment by claiming the death benefit due upon the
death of the insured.6
Large investment companies that purchase life insurance policies
through viatical settlements often resell fractional interests in these settle-
ments to individual retail investors.7 This practice has increased competi-
tion to purchase policies, has enabled thousands of small investors to take
advantage of the lucrative investment opportunities this service offers and
has dramatically increased the capital available to companies investing in
of policy); Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI (explaining that viatical settlement com-
panies purchase life insurance policies from terminally-ill individuals for large one-
time lump-sum payment).
4. See Glick, supra note 1, at 957.
5. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 537 (explaining that life insurance policies
purchased in viatical settlements are typically purchased for amount that repre-
sents 20% to 40% discount to face value); Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17 (discuss-
ing method viatical settlement firms employ to sell fractional interests in life
insurance policies of AIDS patients to retail investors); Glick, supra note 1, at 957
(noting that life insurance policies are purchased in viatical settlements for 50% to
80% of face value); Peloso & Sarnoff, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing that life insur-
ance policies are purchased in viatical settlements for 60% to 80% of face value);
Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI (noting that life insurance policies are purchased
in viatical settlement for 70% to 80% of face value); Stone, supra note 1, at NI
(noting that life insurance policies are purchased in viatical settlements typically
for no less than 60% of face value, but sometimes such policies have been
purchased for 50% to 80% of face value, and even as low as 27% to 30% of face
value).
6. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 537 (explaining that investors' returns from viati-
cal settlements come at maturation of death benefits claim, in other words, only
upon death of insured); Glick, supra note 1, at 957 (same); Peloso & Sarnoff, supra
note 3, at 3 (explaining that investor, who purchases interest in terminally ill indi-
vidual's life insurance policy, receives benefits of policy upon death of insured);
Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI (noting that viatical settlement firms purchase ter-
minally-ill individuals' rights to obtain death benefits from their life insurance pol-
icy); Stone, supra note 1, at NI (explaining that investors reap benefits upon death
of terminally-ill patients).
7. See Glick, supra note 1, at 957-58. Viatical settlement companies typically
fall into two categories: those that match investors with terminally insured who
wish to sell their life insurance policies for an immediate cash settlement and those
more sophisticated companies, financed through private funds or the sale of stock,
who purchase policies from the insured, hold all rights to the policies, become the
named beneficiaries of the policies and resell fractional interests in the policies to
retail investors. See id. at 957; see also Lfe Partners, 87 F.3d at 545-46 (explaining
three methods of investment in viatical settlement offered by Life Partners, encom-
passing two typical methods with optional variations); Peloso & Sarnoff, supra note
3, at 3 (explaining two typical types of investments offered, by viatical settlement
companies).
[Vol. 42: p. 925
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viatical settlements. 8 The influx of individual unsophisticated investors
into this unregulated market and the large number of start-up-firms offer-
ing individual investors access to this market has dramatically increased
the potential for investors to be defrauded or abused by inexperienced or
sham investment companies.9 Experts differ as to whether investments in
viatical settlements should be regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in order to protect consumers from possible abuse or
fraud.1 0
The issue of whether the purchase of a fractional interest in a viatical
settlement falls within the regulatory powers of the SEC was recently ad-
dressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
8. See Stone, supra note 1, at NI. Stone explains that rapid growth in the
viatical settlement industry has been beneficial to both buyers and sellers. See id.
Buyers have benefitted because competition to purchase policies has kept
purchase prices high. See id. Sellers have benefitted because the rush of investors
into the market has prompted heady competition between major insurance com-
panies attempting to enter the market and start-up companies already in the mar-
ket. See id. Competition for investment dollars has kept dealing above board
overall. See id. This flurry of activity has also alerted some states and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the need to regulate this booming industry.
See id.; see also Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17-18 (recognizing benefits investors
and terminally ill derive from viatical settlements, potential for investor fraud and
lack of grievances filed by investors against viatical settlement companies); Glick,
supra note 1, at 958-84 (discussing regulation of investment contracts in viatical
settlements under federal securities laws); Peloso & Sarnoff, supra note 3, at 3 (dis-
cussing if and when viatical settlement is subject to federal securities laws); Cren-
shaw, supra note 1, at COI (noting SEC's desire to regulate investment in viatical
settlement and congressional considerations of tax consequences of viatical
settlements).
9. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538-39 (recognizing potential for abuse of indi-
vidual investors in rapidly growing viatical settlement industry and fact that many
viatical settlement companies currently register these investments as securities with
SEC); Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17 (same); Stone, supra note 1, at NI (noting
California's concern over unregulated viatical settlement companies and states' ef-
forts to develop effective regulation in absence of federal regulation).
10. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 94-1861, 1996 WL 195136, at *1 (D.D.C.
Mar. 19, 1996) (granting emergency order enjoining Life Partners from resuming
sale of investment contracts in viatical settlements because of perceived need for
regulation of investments), remanded by 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996); SEC v. Life
Partners, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C.) (reiterating need to regulate investments
in viatical settlements sold by Life Partners to individual investors), remanded by 87
F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17-18 (recognizing need for
federal regulation of investments in viatical settlements under auspices of SEC);
Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI (explaining potential ramifications of failure to
regulate viatical settlements and industry reaction to lower court's disposition of
Life Partners case); Stone, supra note 1, at NI (explaining need for regulation and
states' efforts to enact regulation). But see Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 548 (finding
investment contracts in viatical settlements were not able to be regulated by SEC
pursuant to federal securities laws); Glick, supra note 1, at 984 (concluding that
viatical settlements are not within regulatory ambit of SEC pursuant to federal se-
curities laws); Peloso & Sarnoff, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion in Life Partners that investments in viatical settlements are not within
regulatory authority of SEC).
1997] NoTE
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in SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.1I In order to make this determination, the D.C.
Circuit first addressed the issue of whether a fractional interest in a viatical
settlement constitutes a "security."1 2 Resolving this issue is a prerequisite
to determining whether sales of these fractional interests fall within the
regulatory power of the SEC.13 The SEC may only regulate fractional in-
terests in viatical settlements if these interests constitute securities. 14
An investment contract is considered a security within the scope of
the Securities Act of 1933 ("the Act") if it is purchased with an expectation
of profits, arising from a common enterprise that depends upon the ef-
forts of others.15 In Life Partners, the D.C. Circuit held that investment
contracts, through which individuals purchased fractional interests in viati-
cal settlements, were not securities. 16 This holding precludes the SEC
from regulating these investment contracts, which are otherwise unregu-
lated, in an effort to protect individual investors from potentially fraudu-
lent schemes.
1 7
This Note discusses the applicability of federal securities laws to frac-
tional investments in viatical settlements. It focuses primarily on the defi-
nition of investment contracts constituting securities and, therefore,
falling within the regulatory authority of the SEC in an effort to determine
whether viatical settlements should fall within the ambit of the SEC's regu-
latory authoriy. Part II of this Note explains the background of the Act
and the development of a test for determining whether an investment con-
tract is within the SEC's regulatory authority. 18 Part II also focuses on the
11. 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
12. See id. at 538; see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) (gov-
erning regulatory authority of SEC regarding primary offering of securities). The
Securities Act of 1933 confers authority on the SEC to regulate any investment
instrument that fits within the Act's definition of a security. See id. § 77(b) (1).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1).
14. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 540.
15. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (holding that in-
vestment is "security" subject to Act if investors purchase with expectation of prof-
its arising from common enterprise that depends upon efforts of others). In
Howey, the Supreme Court announced what has come to be accepted as the defini-
tive test of whether an investment contract constitutes a security for purposes of
the Securities Act of 1933 ("the Act"). See Lfe Partners, 87 F.3d at 543 (" [W] hether
[the viatical settlements] are properly characterized as securities within the terms
of the 1933 Act ... is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Howey.").
16. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 548. Announcing its holding, the court explained
that:
[T]he SEC is unable to show that the promoter's efforts have a predomi-
nant influence upon investors' profits; and because all three elements of
the Howey test must be satisfied before an investment is characterized as a
security, we must conclude that the viatical settlements marketed by [Life
Partners] are not securities.
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (governing SEC's regulatory authority).
18. For a further discussion of the background of the Act, see infra notes 28-
38 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42: p. 925
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evolution of this test.1 9 Part III describes the development of viatical set-
dements as investment vehicles.20 Part III also depicts the viatical settle-
ments offered by Life Partners, Inc. and the factual background leading
up to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Life Partners.2 1 Part III further explains
the procedural history of Lfe Partners.22 Part IV outlines the court's appli-
cation of the Act, in light of relevant precedent, to the investment con-
tracts sold by Life Partners, Inc. 23 Part IV also critically examines the D.C.
Circuit's disposition of Life Partners and the dissent's counterpoints. 24 Part
V discusses the potential legal ramifications of the D.C. Circuit's alteration
of the test of whether an investment contract is within the SEC's regulatory
authority.25 Further, Part V discusses the potential impact of Lfe Partners
on individuals investing in viatical settlements. 26 Finally, Part VI con-
cludes that Lfe Partners shifts the heavy burden of regulating investment in
viatical settlements to the states and questions how and whether the states
will undertake this burden.27
II. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION AND CASE LAw
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and Its Traditional Application
The Act is a broad remedial statute that attempts to protect individual
investors from fraud by regulating primary offerings of securities. 28 The
Act was promulgated in an effort to stabilize the American securities indus-
19. For a further discussion of the test for determining whether an investment
contract may be considered a security and regulated by the SEC, see infra notes 39-
115 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the history of viatical settlements, see infra
notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the investment vehicles offered by Life Part-
ners, see infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the procedural history of the Life Partners deci-
sion, see infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the court's reasoning in the Life Partners deci-
sion, see infra notes 144-83 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of the critical analysis of the Life Partners decision,
see infra notes 184-237 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the potential legal ramifications of the Life
Partners decision, see infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
26. For a further discussion of the potential impact of the Life Partners deci-
sion on the viatical settlement industry, see infra notes 238-44 and accompanying
text.
27. For a further discussion of the impact of the Life Partners decision on the
states, see infra note 240-44 and accompanying text.
28. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (explaining that Act
was intended to be broadly construed and applied to all schemes that would ordi-
narily be considered securities); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
351 (1943) (recognizing that Act does not stop regulating with obvious and com-
monplace, but extends coverage to novel, uncommon and irregular devices if they
appear to be securities); H.R. REP. No. 85, at 11 (1933) (explaining that Act is
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try and restore public confidence in domestic financial markets. 29 Consis-
tent with its broad purpose, the Act defines the term "security" very
broadly, conferring broad regulatory power on the SEC.30
The Act's comprehensive definition of the term "security" includes
the term "investment contract." 31 Inevitably, definition of the vague term
"investment contract", as it is used to define the term "security", has been
the subject of litigation since the passage of the Act.32 The landmark case
of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 3 3 defined this term for purposes of the Act and
provided a test for determining whether the Act is applicable to any given
investment contract.3
4
The Supreme Court decided Howey in 1946.35 In this decision, the
Court defined the term "investment contract."3 6 The Court also stated
that the test of whether an investment contract is a security within the
29. See Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that Act was "intended to en-
courage 'honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence' in
the investment markets" (quoting Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to
Congress (March 29, 1933) reprinted in 77 CONG. REc. 937 (1933)).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1) (1994). The definition of security contained
within the Act is very broad. See id. Section 77(b)(1) reads as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partic-
ipation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, invest-
ment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a secur-
ity, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
'security', or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. See id. (defining term security as, among other things, investment
contract).
32. See, e.g., Howey, 328 U.S. at 293 (holding that fractional interests in orange
groves are investment contracts constituting securities and explaining reasons for
this determination); Joiner, 320 U.S. at 344 (holding that fractional interests in oil
leases are investment contracts constituting securities).
33. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
34. Id. at 298-99. In Howey, the Supreme Court laid down what was to become
the definitive three-pronged test for determination of whether an investment in-
strument capable of being described as an investment contract was a security. See
id. at 299. The Howey Court stated that an investment contract that involved the
"investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others" constituted a security. Id. at 301. Subsequent judicial modifica-
tion by the Supreme Court and several federal courts of appeals have transformed
this statement into a simple, well recognized three-pronged test requiring (1) an
expectation of profits arising from (2) a common enterprise that (3) depends
upon the efforts of others. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 542 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
35. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293.
36. See id. at 301. In Howey, the Supreme Court stated that the test of whether
an investment contract constitutes a security is:
[Vol. 42: p. 925
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meaning of the Act is "whether the scheme involves the investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts
of others."37 This statement has since been distilled, with little substantive
alteration, into a three-pronged test for determining whether an invest-
ment contract constitutes a security for purposes of the Act.38
B. Application of the Howey Test
An investment contract is a security, subject to regulation by the SEC,
if investors purchase it with (1) an expectation of profits arising from (2) a
common enterprise that (3) depends upon the efforts of others.39 Subse-
quent to the statement of this test in Howey, each of the three prongs has
been further explained and interpreted. 40 These interpretations have
broadened the scope of the Howey test as courts have systematically applied
each prong of the test.
4 1
1. The First Prong: Expectation of Profits
The Howey Court determined that an expectation of profits arising
from an individual's investment was crucial to an investment contract be-
ing considered a security.4 2 Holding that investors' purchases of frac-
[W]hether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others. If that
test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or
non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or without
intrinsic value. The statutory policy of affording broad protection to in-
.vestors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id.
38. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 542.
39. See id.
40. See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 854 (1975) (holding
that shares of stock that entitled purchasers to lease apartment in state-subsidized
nonprofit housing cooperative were not securities under Howey test); Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (holding that liquid capital share in Illinois savings
and loan association was security under Howey test); Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 536
(interpreting common enterprise requirement of second prong of Howey test);
Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); Guidry v.
Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1992) (using "fair resemblance"
test to determine whether postdated check satified first prong of Howey test); Noa
v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (interpreting
third prong of Howey test); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,
481-82 (9th Cir. 1973) (interpreting third prong of Howey test).
41. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 542. Courts typically attempt to examine each
prong of the Howey test independently, as the court in Life Partners explained, " [ t] o
the extent practical we examine each component of the [Howey] test separately."
Id.
42. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-300. Examination of the Howey opinion clearly
demonstrates that the Supreme Court considered an expectation that profit, as it
understood the meaning of the word, was pivotal to a determination that an invest-
ment contract constituted a security. See id. The Court observed that the compa-
nies selling the real-estate-based investment contracts involved in Howey were
offering something more than fee simple interests in land, something different
7
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tional interests in a productive tract of farm land coupled with a
management contract met this criteria, the Court observed that the inves-
tors had been offered an opportunity that was far in excess of a mere inter-
est in land accompanied by management services.4 3 The determinative
factor establishing this prong of the test was the fact that investors were
drawn to purchase their interests by the prospect of receiving profits on
their purely monetary investments.44 The scope of the definition of "prof-
its" in the Howey test has been the subject of much debate. 45
The Supreme Court's decision in Howey closely tracked the only
analogous precedent existing at the time, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.46
from a farm or orchard coupled with management services. See id. The Court
stated:
They [were] offering an opportunity to contribute money and to share in
the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by
[investors]. They [were] offering this opportunity to persons who reside
in distant localities and who lack the equipment and experience requisite
to the cultivation, harvesting and marketing of the citrus products. Such
persons have no desire to occupy the land or to develop it themselves;
they are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their investment.
Id. With this statement, the Court provided a key insight into its reasoning and
also laid the ground work for the profit test, which was eventually developed in the
first prong of the test set down in Howey. See id. The Supreme Court in Forman
further clarified the profit test of the first prong of the Howey test stating: "What
distinguishes a security transaction ... is an investment where one parts with his
money in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others, and not where he
purchases a commodity for personal consumption." Forman, 421 U.S. at 858. In
Forman, the Court clarified its view of profit for the purposes of federal securities
laws. See id. For these purposes profit must, "in conformity with ordinary usage, be
in the form of a financial return on investment, not in the form of consumption.
This principle distinguishes between buying a note secured by a car and buying the
car itself." Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 543.
43. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
44. See id. at 300; see also Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 339 (stating that capital shares
paying dividends tied directly to profit of savings and loan association have essen-
tial attributes of investment contracts constituting securities for purposes of federal
securities laws);Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352 (finding that offering and selling investment
contracts for fractional interests in land that is subject of oil leases constitutes sale
of securities when language promoting investment emphasized prospect of
splendid returns on one's investment); Guidry, 954 F.2d at 284 (stating that expec-
tation of profit on investment contract that constitutes security carries with it con-
notation of risk including potential appreciation or depreciation in value of
investment contract).
45. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
46. 320 U.S. 344 (1943). Prior to its decision in Howey, the Supreme Court
decided Joiner. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 344. In Joiner, the Court found that investors'
purchases of fractional interests in oil leases and the tract of land subject to the
leases, coupled with an agreement that the promoter drill exploratory wells, were
investment contracts that constituted securities. See id. at 348. Announcing its
holding in Joiner, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the individual investors
purchased the fractional interests in the land and leases in an effort to obtain a
financial return on their investment. See id. at 346-47, 349.
Howey, like Joiner, involved the sale of an investment that was based upon the
ownership of a fractional interest in a larger tract of land tied to a fractional inter-
est in a common venture that was aimed at providing returns to investors by dra-
932 [Vol. 42: p. 925
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Deciding Joiner, the Court determined that sales of fractional interests in
oil leases constituted sales of securities. 47 The profits anticipated by pur-
chasers of fractional interests in Joiner were to come from capital apprecia-
tion, resulting from the development of the individuals' initial capital
investments. 48 The Howey Court built its comprehensive three-pronged
test around the Joiner decision, recognizing that, for purposes of determin-
ing whether an investment contract constituted a security, anticipated
profit included an expectation of capital appreciation resulting from a
purely monetary investment in a venture that depended entirely on the
efforts of others to succeed. 49
matically improving the value of the land underlying the .transaction. See Howey,
328 U.S. at 293 (noting individual investors purchased fractional shares of citrus
grove and 85% also engaged Howey to operate their fraction of grove along with
its cultivation of larger property in exchange for return that was estimated to be
between 10% and 20% of their original investment); Joiner, 320 U.S. at 34546
(noting that individual investors purchased fractional shares of tract of land in
McCullogh County, Texas that were coupled with assignment of oil leases covering
tract purchased and promoter promised to drill test wells that, when shown to be
productive, would produce dramatic appreciation in investors' initial investment).
In each of these cases, the fractional shares of land were too small, or configured
in such a manner as to be too inconvenient to facilitate any use other than that for
which they were sold, as portions of a tract to be operated for a specific purpose.
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 295; Joiner, 320 U.S. at 345-46. Observing the similarity of
these cases, the Court relied heavily on Joiner in formulating the Howey test. See
Howey, 328 U.S. at 300-01.
47. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 355.
48. See id. at 346-47. Evaluating the promotion of the investment contracts
offered and sold, the Joiner Court found sufficient evidence that the assigned leases
and underlying tracts of land were sold solely as a method of securing financial
profit to investors. See id. at 346. Promotional materials circulated by the promot-
ers of the investment contracts read:
[W]e are submitting this proposition to you in language that will appeal
only to business people who are interested in making an investment
where they have a good chance for splendid returns on the investment
.... [I]f you send in an order for twenty acres.., you will get ten acres
Free in the next block of acreage we drill which is most likely to be in
Concho County, Texas. You will really be in the oil business. Remember,
if you do not make money on your investment it will be impossible for us
to make money .... Fortunes made in oil go to those who invest.
Id. at 346-47 n.3.
49. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. Observing that the Joiner Court had elevated sub-
stance over form in reaching its conclusion that the investment contracts at issue
were securities, the Howey Court stated its view that:
[A] n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a con-
tract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a com-
mon enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the
enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in
the physical assets employed in the enterprise. Such a definition neces-
sarily underlies this Court's decision in SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
and has been enunciated and applied many times by lower federal courts.
Id. at 298-99. With this statement, the Howey Court set down the framework of
what has come to be the modern Howey test. Id.
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Participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds
was included in the Howey test's definition of "profits" by the Supreme
Court's decision in Tcherepnin v. Knight.50 In Tcherepnin, the Court ob-
served that the payment of dividends on investment contracts indicated
that investors expected to receive profits as a return on their invest-
ments. 51 This expectation of profits through the receipt of dividends gave
the subject investment contracts the most essential attribute of investment
contracts constituting securities.5 2
In contrast, the Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman53
declined to characterize "stock" held by individuals in a housing coopera-
tive as a security. 5 4 The stock failed to satisfy the first prong of the Howey
test because individuals were attracted to purchase it by the prospect of
acquiring a place to live, rather than the prospect of receiving a financial
return on their investment.5 5 The Court held that this type of return on
50. 389 U.S. 332 (1967). In Tcherepnin, the Court determined that the profit
prong of the Howey test was satisfied by the fact that the holders of capital shares in
a savings and loan association paid dividends "tied directly to the amount of profits
[the savings and loan] makes from year to year." Id. at 339. Because these divi-
dends were an apportionment of the profits made by the venture in which the
individuals had invested, the dividends were considered profits for purposes of the
Howey test. See id. Accordingly, the definition of "expectation of profit" typically
employed in the Howey test was expanded to include dividends on capital invest-
ments in a venture that met all other prongs of the test. See id. After concluding
that the capital shares in Tcherepnin were investment contracts constituting securi-
ties for purposes of federal securities laws, it continued to observe that these shares
could likely meet the definition of security if the Court were to apply another por-
tion of the definition. See id. The Court said:
[W]e need not rest our decision on that conclusion alone. "Instruments
may be included within any of [the Act's] definitions, as a matter of law, if
on their face they answer to the name or description." The ... shares fit
well within several other descriptive terms contained in [the definition of
security]. For example, the... shares can be viewed as "certificate [s] of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement .... ." [The]
same factors make the shares "stock" under [federal securities laws]. Fi-
nally, the . . .shares can be considered "transferable share[s]".
Id. (citations omitted) (quotingJoiner, 320 U.S. at 351).
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
54. Id. at 853.
55. See id. Forman involved the sale of shares of "stock" in a state-subsidized
housing cooperative. Id. at 837. Prospective tenants were required to purchase a
requisite number of shares-18 shares at $25 per share for each room desired in
the housing project-in order to obtain an apartment. See id. at 838. The shares
were nontransferable, except on death to a surviving spouse. See id. The shares
could only be sold back to the developer, for the original purchase price of $25, on
termination of occupancy in the housing project. See id. In light of the economic
realities of the instruments purchased, the Court stated that the purchasers could
not have realistically believed that "federal securities laws governed their
purchase." Id. at 851. The Court stated: "Common sense suggests that people
who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in a state-subsidized coopera-
tive, for their personal use, are not likely to believe that in reality they are purchas-
ing investment securities .... . Id.
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individuals' capital is outside the definition of profit that satisfies the
Howey test.56 The Court ruled that federal securities laws do not apply
when investors purchase investment contracts with the expectation of per-
sonally consuming or using the interest acquired. 57 The Court narrowed
56. See id. at 852-58. Three theories of profit were advanced in the Forman
case. Id. These theories included (1) acquiring a place to live through the invest-
ment, (2) deductibility for tax purposes of the portion of the investors' monthly
rental charge applied to interest paid on the mortgage and (3) the financial bene-
fit received from acquiring a property with rent substantially lower than other com-
parable properties. See id. at 855. The Court summarily dismissed the latter two
theories. See id. Of the tax deduction profit theory, the Court said, "[w] e know of
no basis in law for the view that the payment of interest, with its consequent de-
ductibility for tax purposes, constitutes income or profits. These tax benefits are
nothing more than that which is available to any homeowner who pays interest on
his mortgage." Id. Likewise, the Court stated that the financial benefit received by
purchasing a property that offers lower rental charges (or acquisition charges)
than comparable properties "is an inappropriate theory of 'profits' that we cannot
accept." Id. The Court explained that:
The low rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies provided by
the State of New York. This benefit cannot be liquidated into cash; nor
does it result from the managerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no
more embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare bene-
fits, food stamps, or other government subsidies.
Id.
The Court dealt with the "acquisition of a place to live" theory in considerably
more detail. Nevertheless, it held that this is not the type of profit that satisfies the
Howey test. See id. at 853. The Court explained that "when a purchaser is moti-
vated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased-'to occupy the land or to
develop it themselves' . . . the securities laws do not apply." Id. at 852-53 (quoting
SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)).
57. See id. Identifying the motivation of the purchasers of "stock" in Forman,
the Court observed that "[i]n the present case there can be no doubt that investors
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by finan-
cial returns on their investments." Id. at 853. Examining the actions of the pro-
moters before the sales transactions took place, consistent with Joiner, the Court
observed that the promotional undertaking of the promoters of the project "em-
phasized the fundamental nature and purpose of the undertaking" as focused on
providing and obtaining housing. Id. Accordingly, the promotional materials
boasted that " [p] eople find living in a cooperative community enjoyable .... Most
people join ... for the simple reason that it is a way to obtain decent housing at a
reasonable price .... The purpose of a cooperative is to provide home ownership
.... " Id. at 853-54. The Court observed that:
[N]owhere does the [promotional] Bulletin seek to attract investors by
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the promoters ....
On the contrary, the Bulletin repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" na-
ture of the endeavor .... It also informs purchasers that they will be
unable to resell their apartments at a profit since the apartment must first
be offered back to [the developer] "at the price .. .paid for it."
Id. at 854. These facts show the lack of profit expectancy relating to the shares
offered and sold in Forman and provide a dramatic contrast to the promotional
materials, emphasizing the prospect of handsome returns, held to be of impor-
tance in Joiner. Compare id. (involving purchase of cooperative housing with no
expectancy of profit), with SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 346 n.3
(1943) (involving purchase of land tracts from which investors expected profits
derived from oil drilling).
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the definition of "profit" by contrasting the return expected in Forman
with the "financial" returns anticipated in Howey, Tcherepnin and Joiner.58
In Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace,59 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit streamlined the profits test of Howey's first prong. 60 The
court summed up precedent and restated the profit test as either capital
appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment or a
participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds.6 1 The
court added that an expectation of profits from an investment contract
must embody some element of risk in the amount of the return or loss of
the investors' capital investment.62 Considering these elements essential
factors, the Fifth Circuit held that investment contracts offering a fixed
rate of return, with no possibility of fluctuation or risk to the investors'
capital, were not investment contracts constituting securities within the
definition of the Act.63 The Guidiy reformulation, requiring risk to inves-
58. Forman, 421 U.S. at 853 (noting that investors were not attracted to buy
shares for prospect of financial returns on their investment).
59. 954 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1992).
60. Id. at 284. In Guidry, the Fifth Circuit provided a coherent analysis and
comparison of Supreme Court precedent regarding development of the second
prong of the Howey test to date. Id. Guidry summed up essential precedent and
recognized the continuing importance of Joiner, Howey and Tcherepnin and the limi-
tation the Court placed on the "flexibly" applied securities laws in Forman. See id.
Expounding what has become the widely accepted "profits test" of the second
prong of the Howey test, the Guidry court explained that "profit," for purposes of
the Howey test is "'either capital appreciation resulting from the development of
the initial investment ... or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of
investors' funds.'" Id. (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at 852).
61. See id.
62. See id. In Guidry, the Fifth Circuit expressed its view that:
[E]xpectation of profit carries with it a connotation of potential apprecia-
tion or depreciation in value of the investment contract. That is, the ar-
rangement must be so structured as to contemplate, at the outset, some
risk-either that the investor could lose his investment, or that the value
of his return could fluctuate.
Id. (emphasis added). This view is contrary to the Supreme Court's statement in
Howey that "[i]f the [Howey] test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise
is speculative or non-speculative .... The statutory policy of affording broad pro-
tection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae."
SEC v. WJ. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (citation omitted).
63. Guidry, 954 F.2d at 284. Guidy involved a check kiting scheme in which
petitioner Guidry continuously exchanged checks with respondent Martin. Id.
For each check that petitioner gave respondent, petitioner received two post-dated
checks in return. See id. One of the checks represented a return of petitioner's
capital investment, the second represented profit earned on the capital invested.
See id.
Applying its requirement that an investment contract constituting a security
carry with it a risk of loss, the Guidry court determined that this check kiting
scheme did not constitute a security. See id. The Fifth Circuit stated:
[T] he post-dated checks were [respondent's] legally binding and fully en-
forceable agreement to pay the amount of the checks on the date they
bore. [Petitioner] implies that [respondent] and [petitioner] recognized
a risk that the checks would be dishonored if [respondent's] venture was
unsuccessful. There is no allegation, however, that [respondent] and
12
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tors' capital or fluctuation in the rate of return, has not been adopted by
the Supreme Court.
64
2. The Second Prong: Common Enterprise
The second prong of the Howey test requires that the investment con-
tract be tied to a common enterprise. 65 Finding a common enterprise
requires a court to make a two-step determination that (1) investors share
commonality and (2) an enterprise exists. 66 If an investment contract fails
[petitioner] agreed that [respondent] would not be liable to [petitioner]
on [respondent's] checks in any circumstances. There was thus no legal
way that [respondent]. could force [petitioner] to accept less than the
amount stated on the post-dated checks in satisfaction of the alleged con-
tract between them.
Id. Thus, applying the Fifth Circuit's fluctuation requirement, these checks failed
the first prong of the Howey test. See id.
64. Id. Subsequent to the decision of Guidry, the Supreme Court has not
voiced an opinion on the fluctuation requirement it imposed. See id. As previously
noted, however, the requirement appears directly contrary to the Court's state-
ment in Howey that "[i]f the [Howey] test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the
enterprise is speculative or non-speculative." Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
65. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-300. Applying the common enterprise require-
ment, the Howey Court explained that fractional interests in an orange grove
[g]ain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed as com-
ponent parts of a larger area. A common enterprise managed by [the
promoter] or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is
therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of
a return on their investments.
Id. at 300. This statement demonstrated the necessity of this requirement to the
test. See id.
66. See Rodriguez v. Banco Centr. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1993). Rodri-
guez best illustrates the separate components of this principle that are also illus-
trated in Howey and Forman. See id. ("Each component in the concept matters.");
see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975) (making
separate component distinction as to shares in housing cooperative); Howey, 328
U.S. at 300 ("Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present
here. The investors provide the capital and share in the earining and profits; the
promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise."). Relying on Howey and
Forman, the Rodriguez court explains:
Each component in the [common enterprise] concept matters.
There are many investments obtained by contract, such as one's home,
that are not an interest in an enterprise. One may have an interest in an
enterprise-an employment contract, for example-that is not an entitle-
ment to profits or increased value. Conversely, in a sole proprietorship
the owner could have a claim on all profits of the enterprise but there
might be no contract or security involved. Further, the Supreme Court
cases mark out a concept, not a precise definition....
... [Olne who buys raw land or even a building, hoping to profit
from rents or the natural increase in the value of-the property, is not
under normal circumstances treated as purchasing a 'security.'
At some point, however, the commitments and promises incident to
a land transfer, and the network of relationships related to the project,
can cross over the line and make the interest acquired one in an ongoing
business enterprise. At that point, the interest may be treated as a secur-
ity, even if not so labeled.
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to exhibit these criteria, it fails to satisfy the second prong of the Howey test
and is not an investment contract constituting a security.
67
a. Commonality
The commonality requirement of the Howey test may be satisfied by
either horizontal commonality or vertical commonality.68 Horizontal
commonality refers to the relationship among investors in an enterprise. 69
It is broadly defined as the tying of each individual investor's fortune to
the fortunes of other investors. 70 This tying together of investors' fortunes
is typified by the pooling of individual investor's assets combined with pro-
rata distribution of profits from the venture.7 1 Simply defined, horizontal
commonality among investors is the pooling of investment funds, sharing
of profits and sharing of losses. 72 This type of commonality is universally
recognized as sufficient to fulfill the commonality requirement of the
Howey test.
73
Unlike horizontal commonality, vertical commonality refers to the
relationship between the investor and the promoter of the venture that
is the subject of the investment contracts. 74 Courts applying the Howey
Rodriquez, 990 F.2d at 10-11 (citations omitted) (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53;
Howey, 328 U.S. at 289-99).
67. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
68. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The D.C.
Circuit followed the universally accepted principal that horizontal commonality
fulfills the commonality requirement of the Howey test. See id.
69. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
condominium transactions were not investment contracts). Explaining this con-
cept, the Second Circuit stated that
[a] common enterprise within the meaning of Howey can be established
by a showing of "horizontal commonality": the tying of each individual
investor's fortunes to the fortunes of the other investors by the pooling of
assets, usually combined with the pro-rata distribution of profits. In a
common enterprise marked by horizontal commonality, the fortunes of
each investor depend upon the profitability of the enterprise as a whole.
Id. (citations omitted). The Second Circuit borrowed this explanation of horizon-
tal commonality from the Sixth Circuit, which earlier stated that "[h]orizontal
commonality ties the fortunes of each investor in a pool of investors to the success
of the overall venture. In fact, a finding of horizontal commonality requires a
sharing or pooling of funds." Hart v. Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001,
1004 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982) (explaining that investment contract constituting
security must be "part of a pooled group of funds"); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1972) (stating that success or failure of other
individual investors' investment contracts must have "direct impact on the profit-
ability of the plaintiffs' contracts" in order for horizontal commonality to be
found).
70. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.
71. See id.
72. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 543.
73. See id.
74. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87-88. In Revak, the Second Circuit acknowledged
the increasing acceptance of vertical commonality as a method of satisfying the
second prong of the Howey test:
[Vol. 42: p. 925
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test to investment contracts have identified and defined two types of verti-
cal commonality, strict vertical commonality and broad vertical
commonality.
75
Each type of vertical commonality is easily distinguishable from the
other. 76 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
noted: "'Strict vertical commonality' requires [only] that the fortunes of
investors be tied to the fortunes of the promoter."77 Broad vertical common-
ality requires that the fortunes of investors be linked to the efforts of the
promoter. 78
The concept of vertical commonality is difficult to establish and not
widely recognized as sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement of
the Howey test.79 Accordingly, while vertical commonality has become a
significant factor in many recent cases, it is not as important as horizontal
commonality, which is universally accepted as sufficient to satisfy the sec-
ond prong of the Howey test.8°
Some circuits hold that a common enterprise can also exist by virtue of
"vertical commonality," which focuses on the relationship between the
promoter and the body of investors .... In an enterprise marked by
vertical commonality, the investors' fortunes need not rise and fall to-
gether; a pro-rata sharing of profits and losses is not required.
Id. at 87 (citations omitted); see Villeneuve v. Advanced Bus. Concepts Corp., 698
F.2d 1121, 1124 (1983) (stating that vertical commonality satisfies second prong of
Howey test), afrd, 730 F.2d 1403 (lth Cir. 1984) (en banc); SEC v. Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that "requisite common-
ality is evidenced by the fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied
to the efficacy" of promoter); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,
482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (acknowledging existence of commonality between body of
investors and promoter as sufficient to satisfy second prong of Howey test).
75. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87-88 (identifying two distinct kinds of vertical com-
monality: "'broad vertical commonality' and 'strict vertical commonality"').
76. See id.
77. Id. at 88 (emphasis added); see also Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d
459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (explaining that strict vertical commonality requires for-
tunes of individual investors to be "tied" to fortunes of promoter).
78. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 88; see also Long v. Schultz Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d
129, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that broad vertical commonality requires that
fate of investors' fortunes "need be linked only" to efforts of promoter of
investment).
79. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 88-89. The language used in Revak demonstrates the
courts' reluctance to accept the concept of vertical commonality as sufficient to
satisfy the second prong of the Howey test:
This Court has not previously considered whether vertical commonality
(strict or otherwise) satisfies the common enterprise requirement of the
Howey test. [W]e need not address the question of whether strict vertical
commonality gives rise to a common enterprise. We do consider whether
broad vertical commonality satisfies Howey's second requirement, and we
hold that it does not.
Id. at 88.
80. See id. at 88-89.
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b. Existence of an Enterprise
The enterprise requirement recently evolved out of Howey and its
progeny as courts repeatedly sought to deal with schemes that offered in-
vestors the opportunity to invest in fractional interests in property.81 In
Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corp.,8 2 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit clarified the enterprise requirement and confirmed its
necessity.83
In Rodriguez, the court explained this requirement, stating that owner-
ship of property alone does not constitute the existence of a business en-
terprise while, conversely, ownership of a security necessarily constitutes
ownership of an interest in a business enterprise. 84 Therefore, the
question of whether a common enterprise exists depends on whether the
interest acquired by the investor is simply an interest in property and noth-
ing more, or whether the property interest is an interest in an ongoing
business enterprise and, thus, constitutes a security within the defintion of
the Act.8 5 Some courts ignore this new portion of the test, while others
merge it into the third prong, giving the issue short shrift. 86 In the inter-
81. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946). The original Howey
test looked for a "common enterprise." See id. The Howey decision, however, care-
fully evaluated each component of the second prong, finding both commonality
and an enterprise. See id. The enterprise requirement was implicitly acknowl-
edged in Joiner, before Howey was decided, when the Supreme Court acknowledged
that individual investors were purchasing more than an interest in real estate, but
also a promise by the promoter to perform duties that were calculated to lead the
appreciation of the investment. See id. at 301; SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 34849, 352 (1943). More recently in McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d
204, 209 (10th Cir. 1975), the court recognized that
the offer and sale of lots in [a] development was not only the offer and
sale of subdivision lots in a real estate development, but the sale of a
contractual promise by [the respondent] to improve the project, includ-
ing the construction of [various appreciable amenities]. The lot purchas-
ers had no control over, or participation in the improvement of the
project, but entrusted their monies solely to the management of [the re-
spondent]. The lots were purchased in expectation that fulfillment of
the promise to improve them.., would result in a substantial increase in
the value of the lots.
Id. From this proposition that there must be something more than simply an un-
derlying asset for an investment contract to constitute a security, the Rodriguez
court divined the principle that "[a]t some point ... the commitments and
promises incident to a land transfer, and the network of relationships related to
the project, can cross over the line and make the interest acquired one in an ongo-
ing business enterprise." Rodriguez v. Banco Centr. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir.
1993). This principle may be applied to the purchase of any property, tangible or
intangible, with an accompanying promise, and transform the transaction into the
sale of a security. See id.
82. 990 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1993).
83. Id. at 11.
84. Id.
85. See id. ("A security might exist if the defendants had promised, along with
land sales, to develop the community themselves.").
86. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 544, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In
Life Partners, the court explained that commonality is usually sufficient to satisfy the
940 [Vol. 42: p. 925
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss3/4
1997] NoTE
est of completeness and caution, this factor must be considered in all ap-
plications of the Howey test because it is gaining more widespread
recognition.
8 7
3. The Third Prong: Profits Derived from the Efforts of Others
The Howey Court stated that in order for an investment contract to
constitute a security it must offer profits generated solely by the efforts of
others.8 8 Subsequent interpretations of this requirement, in light of the
intent of the Act, have splintered this prong into a multi-step inquiry.
89
Consequently, the third prong of the test currently requires that (1) the
investment contract offer profits generated predominantly by the efforts
of others and (2) the efforts taken to generate profits must be
significant.90
a. Profits Derived Predominantly from the Efforts of Others
The Howey test's requirement that profits from an investment contract
be derived solely from the efforts of others was first questioned in SEC v.
second prong of the Howey test when it is "obvious that there is (an enterprise) in
the picture." Id. at 544. From this point, the Life Partners court indicated it would
consider the issue in its discussion of the third prong of the Howey test. See id.
After resolving that the investment contracts sold by Life Partners were not securi-
ties, the court stated, "[w]e see no 'venture' associated with the ownership of an
insurance contract from which one's profit depends entirely upon the mortality of
the insured." Id. at 548.
87. See Rodriguez, 990 F.2d at 10-11 (recognizing enterprise requirement);
Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that even land
bought purely for investment purposes is not security if land is not coupled with
something else that constitutes business enterprise), modified, 885 F.2d 1449 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1039
n.1 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that incidental promises by seller such as to install
access road or electricity are not sufficient to transform purchase of interest in
land into business enterprise for purposes of federal securities laws).
88. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299, 301 (1946). Use of the word
"solely" by the Howey Court should be noted. Id. Subsequent to this statement, the
Supreme Court has constantly omitted the word "solely" from the third prong of
the Howey test. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)
(explaining that Court looks for "profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others"); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338-40 (1967)
(acknowledging that Court said "solely" in Howey, but actually meant for test to be
applied flexibly, even reading out this requirement in effort to elevate substance
over form).
89. See SEC v. International Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (noting that investors' profits expected to result, "if not solely, at least
predominantly" from efforts of promoter); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 408
n.59 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting "solely" requirement of Howey test should not be read
strictly or literally); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir.
1974) (stating that critical inquiry is whether efforts made by promoter or third
party are "undeniably significant" to success of enterprise); SEC v. Glenn W. Tur-
ner Enters., Inc. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (10th Cir. 1973) (same).
90. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545.
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Glenn W Turner Enterprises, Inc.9 1 In this decision, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit modified the third prong of the Howey
test in order to classify an investment contract that required individual
investors to exert some efforts in order to realize a return as a security.
92
The Ninth Circuit's modification of the Howey test was impliedly endorsed
by the Supreme Court in Forman.
93
The Ninth Circuit felt free to depart from the widely criticized bright-
line rule requiring that investors' profits be derived solely from the efforts
of others because this formalism was unduly restrictive of courts' ability to
classify some schemes as securities. 94 Such formalism led to absurd results
in some cases and made it potentially easy for novel schemes to evade
securities regulation by simply requiring an investor to contribute some
91. 474 F.2d 476 (1973). Removal of the word "solely" from the requirements
of the third prong of the Howey test was implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court
in Forman. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. The Court stated that
[t]his test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run
through all of the Court's decisions defining a security. The touch stone
is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others.
Id.
92. See Turner, 474 F.2d at 481-82 ("Strict interpretation of the requirement
that profits to be earned must come 'solely' from the efforts of others has been
subject to criticism."). Removing the "solely" requirement, the Ninth Circuit
stated that:
For purposes of the present case, the sticking point in the Howey defini-
tion is the word "solely," a qualification which of course exactly fitted the
circumstances in Howey. All the other elements of the Howey test have
been met here. There is an investment of money, a common enterprise,
and the expectation of profits to come from the efforts of others. Here,
however, the investor, or purchaser, must himself exert some efforts if he
is to realize a return on his initial cash outlay. He must find prospects
and persuade them to attend Dare Adventure Meetings, and at least some
of them must then purchase a plan if he is to realize that return. Thus it
can be said that the returns or profits are not coming 'solely' from the
efforts of others.
We hold, however, that in light of the remedial nature of the (fed-
eral securities legislation], the statutory policy of affording broad protec-
tion to the public, and the Supreme Court's admonitions that the
definition of securities should be a flexible one, the word "solely" should
not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an invest-
ment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if not in
form, securities .... Adherence to [a strict interpretation of the solely
requirement of Howey] could result in a mechanical, unduly restrictive
view of what is and what is not an investment contract. It would be easy to
evade by adding a requirement that the buyer contribute a modicum of
effort .... [T]he fact that the investors [are] required to exert some
efforts.., should not automatically preclude a finding that the Plan ... is
an investment contract.
Id.
93. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
94. See Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
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NOTE
minimal effort as a prerequisite to receiving a return on his or her invest-
ment.95 The Ninth Circuit's decision embraced the intent underlying the
Act and the spirit of post-1933 securities jurisprudence.9 6
Removing the "solely" bright line from the Howey test was consistent
with the longstanding judicial view that, as remedial measures, federal se-
curities regulations should remain flexible. 9 7, Federal securities laws are
interpreted broadly and realistically in an effort to regulate all schemes
involving securities in substance, if not form.9 8 Flexibility in interpreting
federal securities laws, including the Act, affords individual investors the
maximum protection possible. 99
The Supreme Court impliedly endorsed the Ninth Circuit's return to
these basic principles and modification of the "solely" bright-line rule in
Forman.100 Following the Ninth Circuit opinion in Turner and the
Supreme Court's omission of the "solely" requirement in Forman, lower
courts have broadened the sweep of the Howey test and the Supreme
Court's definition of investment contracts that constitute securities.10 1
b. Promoter's Efforts to Generate Profit Must Be Significant
Eliminating the only bright line in the Howey test, Turner introduced a
more realistic standard into the third prong of the test.10 2 The Turner
court evaluated the efforts of the investment contract promoter to deter-
mine whether the efforts undertaken by the promoter were significant
95. See id.
96. See SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); see also Forman, 421
U.S. at 451-52 (emphasizing substance over form in interpreting and applying fed-
eral securities laws); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 337 (1967) (explaining
that federal securities laws "embod[y] a flexible rather than a static principle");
H.R. REP. No. 85, at 11 (1933) (stressing broad application of federal securities
laws to "many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the
ordinary concept of a security").
97. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
98. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 849 ("The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and
1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market.");
Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336 ("[W]e are reminded that, in searching for the mean-
ing and scope of the word 'security' in the Act, form should be disregarded for
substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality."); Howey, 328 U.S. at
301 (noting that statutory policy is to afford broad protection to investors).
99. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 ("The statutory policy of affording broad pro-
tection to investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae.").
100. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
101. See id.
102. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
Rejecting the "solely" requirement, which was destined to lead to absurd results in
several cases, the Turner court adopted a test that exalted substance over form. Id.
The court adopted "a more realistic test, whether the efforts made by those other
than the investor are undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial ef-
forts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." Id.
1997]
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managerial tasks essential to the success of the enterprise.1 0 3 The invest-
ment contracts in Turner constituted securities because the money and ef-
forts of each individual investor purchased the right to share in proceeds
resulting from a scheme that was perpetuated by the efforts of the
promoter.1
0 4
Following the Ninth Circuit, most circuits have incorporated this sig-
nificant efforts requirement into the Howey test.10 5 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, for example, endorsed the signifi-
cant efforts requirement in McCown v. Heidler.10 6 The McCown court held
that individual investors could prove that their purchases of lots in a
planned community were investment contracts constituting securities.
10 7
The court's holding was premised on its understanding that the sale of lots
in this development were actually sales of properties coupled with the pro-
moter's contractual promises to improve the project, thereby substantially
increasing the value of the lots.' 0 8 In reaching its determination, the
103. Id. at 482-83. The Turner court found the investment contracts to be
securities because the promoters were performing significant efforts toward to the
success of the venture. Id. The court said:
The purchaser is sold the idea that he will get a fixed part of the proceeds
of the sales .... [T]o get a share, he invests three things: his money, his
efforts to find prospects and bring them to the meetings, and whatever it
costs him to create an illusion of his own affluence. He invests them in
Dare's get-rich-quick scheme. What he buys is a share in the proceeds of
the selling efforts of Dare. Those efforts are the sine qua non of the
scheme; those efforts are what keeps [sic] it going; those efforts are what
produces the money which is to make him rich. In essence, it is the right
to share in the proceeds of those efforts that [the investor] buys.
Id.
104. Id. at 482.
105. See, e.g., SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that promoters' efforts must be "undeniably significant" in order to
satisfy third prong of Howey test).
106. 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
107. Id. at 209. McCown came to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit on appeal of an order granting summary judgment to the defend-
ants. Id. at 206. The lower court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment was reversed on appeal and the case remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion of the court. See id. at 207. Overturning the lower
court's order, the court of appeals observed that "[t]he plaintiffs presented evi-
dence which could show that the sale of ... lots constituted more than the mere
sale of real estate." Id. at 209.
108. See id. The situation in McCown was closely analogous to the situation
presented to the Supreme Court in Howey:
The lots were purchased in expectation that fulfillment of the promise to
improve them by [the promoter] would result in a substantial increase in
the value of the lots. The lots were sold as, and purchased for, investment
.... [A]ffidavits of several lot purchasers indicated that they purchased
the lots as an investment.
Id. Like the fractional interests in the orange grove sold by W.J. Howey Co., the
subdivided lots in the proposed golf, tennis and equestrian resort sold by Heidler
Corporation in McCown were found to be not mere interests in land, but interests
in land coupled with a promise that made them part of a common enterprise de-
pendent upon the efforts of the promoter in order to return a profit. Id.
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Tenth Circuit examined the promoter's efforts prior to offering the lots
for sale to investors.10 9 The court's holding hinged on the significant
managerial efforts that the promoter undertook before and after selling
the lots in an effort to insure the success of the project. 110
The Ninth Circuit further clarified its significant efforts requirement
in Noa v. Key Futures, Inc."' In Noa, the court held that investors'
purchases of fractional interests in a larger purchase of silver bars did not
constitute securities. 112 These investment contracts were not securities be-
cause the investors' profits depended solely upon fluctuations of the silver
market. 113
The Noa court distinguished McCown, indicating that the promoter's
promises to deliver a specified quantity and quality of silver in the name of
each individual investor and the promoter's offer to store the silver free of
charge did not satisfy the significant efforts required by the Turner stan-
dard.1 14 The court emphasized that the investors did not share in the
profits or risks of the silver purchase itself, but simply took delivery of a
fixed interest and speculated on the silver market's performance from that
point forward.1 15
109. See id. Examining the efforts undertaken by the promoter before offer-
ing the investment contracts for sale, the court found that significant efforts had
already been undertaken. See id. The promoter had sent "employees and sales-
men to attend four-week training sessions." Id. The promoter also "held public
seminars using [professional sales] methods, brochures and films to show the ad-
vantages of real estate investment." Id. at 210. At seminars, the promoter empha-
sized individual investors' ability to make "fortunes" and "get rich while sleeping."
Id. Real estate was touted as the "one safe, sure, successful investment." Id. Fur-
thermore, the promoter filed a "General Form for Registration of Securities" with
the SEC, stating that the promoter was "selling lots to individual for investment
purposes and ultimately for individuals to construct a home and retire." Id.
110. See id. at 211.
111. 638 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
112. Id. at 79.
113. See id. Applying the Howey test to the facts of the Noa case, the court
observed that "the profits to the investor depended upon the fluctuations of the
silver market, not the managerial efforts of [the promoter]." Id.
114. See id. at 80. The court stated that "[plurchase of the silver and the free
storage do not in our opinion amount to the 'undeniably significant' efforts re-
quired by SEC v. Glenn Turner." Id. (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc.,
474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)).
115. See id. Observing that the investors returns were not dependent, in any
way, on the efforts of the promoter, the court noted that "[t]he decision to buy or
sell was made by the owner of the silver." Id. at 79. Further, the court noted:
The method by which the silver was to be purchased by the seller did not
alter the relationship of the seller and the buyers. It was [the promoters']
obligation to deliver a given amount of silver of .999 purity in return for a
fixed price, regardless of the method by which it acquired the silver ....
[T]he buyers did not share in the profits or risks of the silver
procurement.
Id. at 80. The promoter in Noa was acting like a broker by providing a fixed com-
modity for a fee. See id. Acting in this capacity is clearly insufficient to be consid-
ered a promoter of an investment contract constituting a security. See id. Like the
broker in Noa, viatical settlement companies that merely match prospective buyers
1997] NOTE 945
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III: FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF SEC V. LIFE PARTNERS, INC.
A. The Development of Viatical Settlements
The AIDS epidemic swept through the United States in the 1980s,
spreading through every ethnic, racial and social class and giving rise to
several new phenomena including the new financial service known as viati-
cal settlement.' 16 Viatical settlement derives its name from "viaticum," the
Latin name for the Roman Catholic sacrament involving the giving of
communion to a dying person.1 17 This name was deemed appropriate by
the industry, as viatical settlement involves the purchase of a terminally-ill
person's life insurance policy.118
The viatical settlement industry has been embroiled in controversy
since its beginning in earnest in 1988.119 From its birth, the viatical settle-
with willing sellers have not been thought of as offering securities for sale. See SEC
v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 54546 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining mechanics
of different methods throgh which invidivual investors participate in viatical settle-
ments); see also Glick, supra note 1, at 957-59 (reiterating that viatical settlement
companies that act as brokers, matching willing buyers with willing sellers for fee,
are clearly not selling securities).
116. See Stone, supra note 1, at NI (explaining advance of AIDS epidemic and
growth of viatical settlement in late 1980s).
117. See id. For a discussion of the origin of the term "viatical settlement," see
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
118. Stone, supra note 1, at NI.
119. See id. (describing opinion of various communities regarding the viatical
settlement industry). Viatical settlement has been criticized as exploitive and mor-
bid. See id. AIDS activists have neither endorsed nor condemned the practice. See
id. At least one ethicist has criticized the policy stating "[iut strikes me as ethically
suspect that people would go around haunting the bedside of the dying, trying to
hawk get-rich schemes for the terminally ill." Id. The motives of AIDS patients
taking advantage of these settlements have been questioned. See id. One article
about viatical settlements reported that
[a] man, who asked not to be identified for tax reasons, said AIDS sapped
his finances and left him with no means of supporting himself.
All he had left was his $250,000 life insurance policy, but it was payable
only when he died. Desperate for money, he sold the policy for $100,000
to an investment company that will redeem the policy when he dies.
"It is a great thing," he said. "I was able to take a trip with my mom and
dad. I was able to settle up some old debts and I am able to afford my
medical coverage."
Id. Others have stated their arguably noble motives:
[A] 33-year-old ... man [stated that] the AIDS virus attacked his body
and bank account quickly, and left him no time to seek bids. [Hie [was]
faced with selling his policy for 27 percent of its face value to a Massachu-
setts company.
"I have absolutely no money at all," he said. "I decided this was the only
way I could keep my apartment. This is not for a European vacation."
He . . . sought just one bid. "I should have had two or three-but I
trusted people."
Id. This individual proceeded to comment on the profits made by investors in
viatical settlements and the low percentage he received as a purchase price for his
policy. See id. He said: "I don't mind them making a profit. The problem, though,
is there is a limit to profit. Let's not overdo it." Id. Still other individuals appear
to be using viatical settlement as a way of shirking their responsibility for medical
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ment industry has blossomed into a financial services behemoth. 120 This
expansion was a function of the ever deepening AIDS crisis and efforts
aimed at increasing the ability of individual investors to participate in this
investment boom.121
In 1989, the viatical settlement industry surfaced as a $5 million per
year industry.' 22 The industry's subsequent diversification enabled it to
mushroom into a $200- million per year industry in 1995.123 Projections
bills resulting from expensive treatment for AIDS-related illnesses. See id. For ex-
ample, one periodical reported:
A 35-year-old North Hollywood man with advanced AIDS said he just re-
ceived a $106,500 viatical settlement, and does not plan to pay taxes on it.
[H]e also does not plan to spend the money on medical bills.
"Since I am not reporting this, I don't want people to know I have it-
and why should I pay for bills?"
He expects that disability payments will cover his living expenses. "Medi-
cal bills-I will let them pile up and make small monthly payments... I
want to use [the money] for good and fun purposes, rather than pay
things off... I ordered a new car... I already spent quite a bit on ...
traveling."
Id.
120. See id. (discussing evolution of viatical settlement industry). In the early
years of the viatical settlement industry, between the opening of the first viatical
settlement company in 1988 and the end of 1992, more than 30 companies en-
tered the industry. See id. These companies included several giant insurance com-
panies, such as Prudential, and several companies formed exclusively for the
purpose of engaging in the practice of viatical settlement, such as Life Partners.
See id. Prudential alone spent more than $34 million on the purchase of life insur-
ance policies in the form of viatical settlements. See id. Other insurance compa-
nies have entered this market by offering their policy holders the option of
accelerated death benefits, which enable them to redeem their life insurance pol-
icy in the event they are diagnosed with a terminal illness at a significant discount
to the face value upon maturity. See id. By 1993, more than $200 million in viatical
settlements were being made per year. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI. This
growth is expected to continue, propelling viatical settlement to a $1 billion per
year industry sometime in the next decade. See id.
121. See Stone, supra note 1, at NI (describing evolution of viatical settlement
industry). In recent years, more, better capitalized companies, formed specifically
for the purpose of conducting viatical settlements, have entered the market. See id.
These companies are typically capitalized through bank loans or public stock offer-
ings. See id. They offer individual investors two methods of investing in viatical
settlements: by acting as a broker matching buyers and sellers, or by purchasing
individual insurance policies and selling fractional interests in the death benefit
that is the subject of the settlement, to be collected upon maturity by individual
investors. See Glick, supra note 1, at 957; see also SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d
536, 545-46 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining mechanics of different methods through
which individual investors can participate in viatical settlement industry).
122. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 n.1 (D.D.C. 1995),
remanded by 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
123. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at C01 (speculating that, by 1995, viatical
settlement industry had grown to $200 million per year industry). For a further
discussion of the size and growth of the viatical settlement industry, see supra note
1 and accompanying text..
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and current trends indicate that investments in viatical settlements will sur-
pass $1 billion per year not long after the millennium. 124
Viatical settlement companies, including Life Partners, adapted to the
needs of individual investors by providing two novel methods that enable
individuals to invest in viatical settlements: viatical settlement companies
(1) simply act as brokers, matching terminally-ill sellers with individual
buyers in exchange for a service fee or (2) purchase the rights to life insur-
ance policies and sell fractional interests in the policies to individual retail
investors. 125 Companies, such as Life Partners, that employ the latter
strategy, purchase life insurance policies, obtain all rights to the policies
and become the named beneficiary of the policies before selling fractional
interests in the policies to retail investors. 12 6
124. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI ("Industry officials say that if [legisla-
tion] is enacted, viatical settlements could jump.., to $1 billion [per year] early in
the next decade.").
125. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545-46 (explaining mechanics of two major
types of viatical settlements that are marketed to individual investors); Glick, supra
note 1, at 957 (explaining major methods that facilitate participation of individual
investors in viatical settlement market: brokered settlements, whereby company
matches individual investors and terminally-ill individuals who wish to sell policies
for fee, and settlements in which settlement company purchases policy directly
from terminally-ill individual and resells fractional interests in policy to retail inves-
tors); Peloso & Samoff, supra note 3, at 3 (recognizing two broad categories of
viatical settlement market).
126. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539 (explaining Life Partners' sales of frac-
tional interests in viatical settlements to individual investors). The court
explained:
[Life Partners] sells fractional interests in insurance policies to retail in-
vestors, who may pay as little as $650 and buy as little as 3% of the bene-
fits of a policy. In order to reach its customers, [Life Partners] uses some
500 commissioned "licensees," mostly independent financial planners.
For its efforts, [Life Partners'] net compensation is roughly 10% of the
purchase price after payment of referral and other fees.
Id. According to Life Partners' president, Life Partners is the fastest growing firm
serving this rapidly growing industry. See id. In 1994, Life Partners revenues of
approximately $150 million accounted for more than half of the industry's annual
estimated revenues of $300 million. See id. This figure is inconsistent with esti-
mates placing total industry revenues in the neighborhood of just $200 million in
1995. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI. Despite the inconsistency of Life Part-
ners' president's estimates with other estimates of the size of the viatical settlement
industry, the fact remains that, at least through 1994, Life Partners was the undis-
puted leader of the viatical settlement industry. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539.
Among its various accomplishments in marketing viatical settlements to retail in-
vestors, it is also credited as being the first company to develop a method through
which investors could participate in viatical settlements through their individual
retirement account (IRA). See id.; see also Glick, supra note 1, at 957 (explaining
differences between brokered and nonbrokered viatical settlements); Peloso & Sar-
noff, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining viatical settlement methods employed by Life
Partners).
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B. Life Partners' Viatical Settlements
Viatical settlement companies that cater to individual investors by of-
fering the opportunity to purchase small inexpensive shares in viatical set-
tlements, have been very successful in recent years. 127 Life Partners is one
of the most successful viatical settlement companies that has employed the
fractional shares method.128 Providing this type of investment vehicle to
individual investors, Life Partners has grown into one of the largest viatical
settlement companies in the United States, with revenues in excess of $150
million in 1995.129 Life Partners makes investment contracts available for
purchase by individual investors in a number of simple and complex man-
ners. Nevertheless, the essential structure of the contract is always
consistent. 130
Life Partners locates terminally-ill individuals who wish to relinquish
all rights to their life insurance policies in exchange for immediate cash
settlements. 13 ' Life Partners' physicians review the individuals' medical
records and independently determine the individuals' prognoses and life
expectancies.132 If an individual is legally competent, has full-blown AIDS
127. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539 (speculating that, in 1995, viatical settle-
ment industry had grown to $300 million per year industry); Crenshaw, supra note
1, at C01 (speculating that, by 1995, viatical settlement industry had grown to a
$200 million per year industry and was expected to surpass $1 billion per year
within next decade).
128. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539. Life Partners' president and 95% benefi-
cial owner, Brian Pardo, explained that, in 1994, Life Partners' revenues alone
accounted for approximately one-half of viatical settlement industry revenues total-
ing approximately $300 million. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 545-46. While Life Partners has offered brokerage services and
opportunities for individual investors to purchase fractional interests in life insur-
ances policies of which Life Partners holds all interests and has become the named
beneficiary, the essential elements of the transactions are consistent. See id. Life
Partners identifies individuals who wish to sell their rights to the death benefits, of
their life insurance policies. See id. at 539. Life Partners then evaluates the in-
sured's medical condition, reviews his insurance policy, negotiates the purchase
price and prepares the legal documents. See id. Life Partners then markets the
policy, in its entirety or in fractional shares, to individual investors. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.; see also Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI (explaining mechanics of
how viatical settlements work and particular criteria of individuals and policies
sought by viatical settlement firms, including Life Partners). Crenshaw explained:
A company agrees to buy the life insurance policy of a dying person. In
Life Partner's case, the criteria include:
1) Having full blown AIDS
2) Have a life expectancy of 24 months or less
3) Be mentally fit
The policy is then sold to an investor who will collect the face value of the
policy when the patient dies.
The patient is paid based on their life expectancy. General guidelines
are:
1) 80 percent on the dollar for people with less than six months to live
2) 70 percent on the dollar for people with six to 12 months to life.
NOTE
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and an acceptably short life expectancy, Life Partners reviews the life in-
surance policy to determine whether it is in good standing and whether
the eventual eligibility of Life Partners to receive the death benefit is in-
contestable. 13 3 If these criteria are met, Life Partners negotiates a
purchase price and procures the policy.1 34 Life Partners maintains the
policy, becomes the .sole beneficiary of the policy and collects the death
benefit upon the insured's death.1 35 After collecting the death benefit,
Life Partners withholds a fee from the funds and distributes the remainder
to investors who have purchased fractional shares as a return on their
investment.136
C. Procedural History of SEC v. Life Partners
In 1995, the SEC filed an action against Life Partners alleging that by
selling fractional interests in viatical settlements to individual investors,
Life Partners was selling unregistered securities in violation of sections
5(a) and (c) of the Act, and section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (collectively, "the Acts").1 37 In August 1995, the district court de-
nied the SEC's request that it enjoin Life Partners from conducting fur-
ther sales. Nonetheless, the court ordered Life Partners to bring its
operations into compliance with the Acts expediently. l3 8 The following
month, Life Partners' motion for a partial stay of the court's August order
pending appeal was denied.1 3 9 Life Partners failed to comply with the
Id.
133. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1995), remanded
by 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Peloso & Sarnoff, supra note 3, at 3 (ex-
plaining Life Partners' criteria for purchasing terminally-ill individual's life insur-
ance policy).
134. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 539-40.
135. See id. at 539.
136. See id.
137. See Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17 (noting that SEC alleged that Life
Partners violated federal securities laws). The SEC did not allege, nor did it take
the position that all viatical settlements constituted securities. See id. at 18. The
SEC merely alleged that three of the methods employed by Life Partners consti-
tuted sales of securities. See id. The SEC alleged that Life Partners' standard pol-
icy, IRA investment policy and long-term policy constituted securities. See id. The
basis for each of these contentions was essentially identical; the SEC contended it
was only Life Partners' repackaging of the settlements and selling of fractional
interests that constituted sales of securities. See id. at 19. The SEC's argument was
based on the necessary and beneficial effects that the disclosure requirement of
federal securities law would have for individual investors purchasing or investing in
fractional interests of viatical settlements held by third parties. See id.
138. Id. at 17-20. Federal securities laws provide that the SEC is "entitled to
seek provisional relief on a 'proper showing' of violative conduct." Id. at 19 (quot-
ing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b), 78u(d)(1)(1994)). The SEC's burden of proof for ob-
taining provisional relief is lighter than that of a private litigant. See id. The SEC
need only show that a "strong prima facie case of previous violations" exists and
that there is "a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated" in order to
obtain the provisional relief sought. See id.
139. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 538 (explaining that after district court's dis-
position of case originally filed by SEC against Life Partners, district court denied
950 [Vol. 42: p. 925
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court's prior orders. 1 40 Consequently, in January 1996, the district court
issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Life Partiers from offering or
selling "unregistered fractional interests in viatical settlements.' 4 1 In
March 1996, after Life Partners filed an affidavit, sworn by its president,
asserting that it had complied with the court's prior orders and planned to
resume the sale of fractional interests in viatical settlements, the court
granted an emergency motion for supplemental provisional relief filed by
the SEC. 1 42 Granting this motion, the court enjoined Life Partners from
selling fractional interests in viatical settlements pending the decision of
the District of Columbia Circuit. 1
4 3
IV: ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN LIFE PARTNERS
A. Narrative Analysis
On July 5, 1996, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia
decided the Life Partners case.'4 Applying the Act and the Howey test, the
court held that the fractional interests in viatical settlements, offered and
sold to individual investors by Life Partners, did not constitute securi-
Life Partners' motion for partial stay of district court's original order, halting its
sales of interests in viatical settlements to individual investors). In denying Life
Partners' motion for a partial stay of the August injunction, the district court also
ordered Life Partners to file a report within 20 days detailing the steps it had taken
to comply with the court's original order that it bring its operations into compli-
ance with federal securities laws. See id.
140. See id.
141. SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 94-1861, 1996 WL 195136, at *1 (D.D.C.
March 19, 1996), remanded by 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In March 1996, issuing
its injunction, the district court observed that:
[T]he defendant's so-called "new" procedures are virtually identical to
the old ones from the perspective of the investor. Defendants give inves-
tors merely theoretical control over their investment by providing them
with an unrealistic option of performing the post-purchase services them-
selves. Defendants' technical changes have done little to alter the sub-
stance of the services provided to investors; thus, the court finds that
defendants' sale of fractional interests in viatical settlements is an invest-
ment contract subject to the securities laws even under defendants' re-
vised procedures.
Id. Accordingly, the district court enjoined Life Partners from "directly or indi-
rectly" selling fractional interests in viatical settlements, pending the decision of
the D.C. Circuit. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 536. Life Partners was argued on April 4, 1996
and decided on July 5, 1996. Id. Life Partners was a split decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. Judge Henderson joined
in the opinion for the Court filed by Judge Ginsburg. See id. Judge Wald was in
the minority and filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 537.
1997] NOTE
27
Davis: Unregulated Investment in Certain Death: SEC v. Life Partners, In
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ties. 14 5 This decision placed these investment contracts outside the regu-
latory authority of the SEC. 1
4 6
The D.C. Circuit methodically applied each individual element of the
Howey test.147 After examining each element, the court reached a 2-1 deci-
sion that the subject investment contracts were not securities. 148 Judge
Ginsburg and Judge Henderson held that these investment contracts are
not securities. 149 Judge Ward, dissenting, argued that these investment
contracts should be classified as securities.
1 50
1. The First Prong: Expectation of Profits
The court found that the investment contracts offered and sold by
Life Partners satisfied the first prong of the Howey test.15 1 Taking stock of
145. See id. at 536. The D.C. Circuit held that
[v]iatical settlement contracts are not exempt from the securities laws as
insurance contracts. Contrary to the district court, however, we conclude
that [Life Partners] contracts are not securities subject to the federal se-
curities laws because the profits from their purchase do not derive
predominantly from the efforts of... [persons] other than the investors.
Id.
146. See id. Deciding that the fractional interests in viatical settlements sold to
investors are not securities within the definition of "security" provided by the Act
placed these investment vehicles outside the regulatory power of the SEC, which is
empowered to regulate all primary offerings of investment contracts that fall
within the definition of securities provided in the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1)
(1994).
147. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 542-48. In its own words, the D.C. Circuit
examined each prong of the Howey test separately "[t]o the extent practical." Id.
at 542.
148. See id. at 536.
149. See id. at 537.
150. See id. at 549-57 (Wald, J., dissenting). Disagreeing with the opinion of
the court regarding its method of evaluating the third prong of the Howey test and
its determination that the subject investment contracts did not satisfy this prong,
Judge Wald stated:
I believe that the majority's position, precluding pre-purchase managerial
activities of a promoter from ever satisfying the third prong of the Howey
test, is unwarranted and will serve to undercut the necessary flexibility of
our securities laws. An approach that allows pre-purchase activities of the
promoter to satisfy the third prong when the realization of investors'
profits depends predominantly on these activities offers a means of distin-
guishing between ordinary investments and securities that both better
conforms to precedent and has a less restrictive effect on the securities
laws.
Id. at 557 (Wald, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 543. Finding the first prong of the Howey test satisfied, the court
stated:
The asset acquired by [a Life Partners] investor is a claim on future death
benefits. The buyer is obviously purchasing not for consumption-un-
matured claims cannot be currently consumed-but rather for the pros-
pect of a return on his investment. As we read the Forman gloss on Howey,
that is enough to satisfy the requirement that the investment be made in
the expectation of profits.
[Vol. 42: p. 925
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precedent and relying principally on Joiner,152 Tcherepnin153 and For-
man,154 the court restated the profit test: profits must be expected to come
in some form of financial return on the individual's investment, not in any
form of consumption.
155
Investors purchasing fractional interests in Life Partner's viatical set-
tlements acquired a claim to future death benefits.1 56 These unmatured
claims could not be consumed, therefore, and the court reasoned that
investors necessarily purchased the interests for the prospect of receiving a
financial return on their investment.' 57 This type of purchase is sufficient
to satisfy the requirement that the investment contract be purchased with
an expectation of profits.158 Accordingly, the court ruled that the invest-
ment contracts offered and sold by Life Partners satisfied the first require-
ment of the Howey test.1
59
2. The Second Prong: Common Enterprise
Applying the second prong of the Howey test, the court determined
that horizontal commonality existed among investors purchasing Life Part-
ners' investment contracts. 160 The court found all three essential ele-
ments of horizontal commonality to be present: pooling of investors'
funds, profit sharing and loss sharing.161
Id. The dissent agreed with the position of the majority regarding the first prong
of the Howey test. See id. at 549 (Wald, J., dissenting).
152. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943) (holding
sales of fractional interest in oil leases were sales of securities).
153. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967) (holding that payment
of dividiends on investment contracts indicated investors expected to receive re-
turn on their investment).
154. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975) (declin-
ing to characterize stock held for purpose of living in housing cooperative as secur-
ity under Act).
155. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 543. The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the
first prong of the Howey test "is only that the expected profits must, in conformity
with ordinary usage, be in the form of a financial return on the investment, not in
the form of consumption." Id.
156. See id. at 546.
157. See id. at 543.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that horizontal commonality is
"ordinarily sufficient to satisfy the common enterprise requirement" of the Howey
test. See id.
161. See id. at 543-45. Applying the second prong of the Howey test to the facts
in Life Partners, the D.C. Circuit described the facts giving rise to its determination
that horizontal commonality was present in Life Partners' investment scheme. See
id. at 543. The court stated:
[Life Partners] brings together multiple investors and aggregates their
funds to purchase the death benefits of an insurance policy. If the in-
sured dies in a relatively short time, then the investors realize profits; if
the insured lives a relatively long time, then the investors may lose money
or at best fail to realize the return they had envisioned; i.e., they experi-
ence a loss of the return they could otherwise have realized in some alter-
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The Life Partners court declined to address the argument that a com-
mon enterprise did not exist between the investors. 16 2 The court acknowl-
edged Life Partners' argument that commonality itself is insufficient to
satisfy the second prong of the Howey test.163 After finding horizontal
commonality, the court stated that the second prong of the Howey test was
satisfied and reserved judgment on whether an enterprise existed for con-
sideration in its evaluation of the third prong of the test.
16 4
3. The Third Prong: Significant Efforts of Others
The D.C. Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's evaluation of the third
prong of the Howey test. 165 The D.C. Circuit dispensed with the "solely"
bright line and examined the facts presented in an effort to determine
whether the investment contracts were dependent upon significant efforts
native investment of equivalent risk. Any profits or losses from [a Life
Partners] contract accrue to all of the investors in that contract; i.e., it is
not possible for one investor to realize a gain or loss without each other
investor gaining or losing proportionately, based upon the amount that
he invested. In that sense, the outcomes are shared among the investors;
the sum that each receives is a predetermined portion of the aggregate
death benefit.
Id. The court went on to state that "we think that pooling is in practice an essential
ingredient of the [Life Partners] program." Id. at 544. Concluding that these fac-
tors are sufficient to establish horizontal commonality, the court did not examine
whether vertical commonality existed on the facts. See id. Likewise, the court did
not express an opinion on whether it considers vertical commonality sufficient to
satisfy the second prong of the Howey test. See id.
162. See id. at 545. Declining to address the argument by Life Partners' that
no enterprise existed under the circumstances of this case, the D.C. Circuit simply
reserved judgment on the issue for evaluation in its application of the third prong
of the Howey test. See id. Only after determining that the third prong of the Howey
test was not satisfied on the facts before it, the D.C. Circuit summarily dispensed
with the enterprise argument stating that "[w]e see here no 'venture' associated
with the ownership of an insurance contract from which one's profit depends en-
tirely upon the mortality of the insured." Id. at 548. Therefore, it is unclear how
this issue would have been resolved if the court had evaluated it within the context
of the second prong of the Howey test.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 545.
165. See id. at 545-48. In Turner, the Ninth Circuit eliminated the require-
ment that investors' profits derive "solely" from the efforts of others in favor of a
requirement that investors' profits derive predominantly from the efforts of others
and that the efforts of those other than the investor must be "undeniably signifi-
cant" to the success of the enterprise. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474
F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court adopted this application of the
third prong of the Howey test in Forman. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 852 (1975); see also SEC v. International Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d
1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (giving federal securities laws broader sweep by elimi-
nating "solely" standard in favor of "predominantly" standard); Goodman v. Ep-
stein, 582 F.2d 388, 408 (7th Cir. 1978) (adopting standards enunciated in Turner
and Forman); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974)
(adopting Turner standards within third prong of Howey test).
[Vol. 42: p. 925
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of the promoter, Life Partners. 166 Employing this approach, the D.C. Cir-
cuit proceeded to draw its own bright-line rule distinguishing between the
'pre-purchase" and "post-purchase" efforts of the promoter.1 67
The D.C. Circuit's approach clearly distinguished between functions
performed by. the promoter before and after individual investors
purchased their fractional interests in Life Partners' viatical settle-
ments.168 The D.C. Circuit chose to disregard any efforts, no matter how
significant, undertaken by the promoter in an effort to improve the return
on individuals' investments before the sale of fractional interests to indi-
vidual investors.1 69 The D.C. Circuit held that pre-purchase efforts are
166. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545. Recognizing the applicability of the Tur-
ner standards in International Loan Network, the court observed that "[t] he final re-
quirement of the Howey test for an investment to be deemed a security is that the
profits expected by the investor must be derived from the efforts of others." Id.
167. See id. The D.C. Circuit appears to have adopted arguments set forth by
Life Partners' in establishing this bright-line rule. See id. The court acknowledged
that
[Life Partners] argues that its pre-purchase functions are wholly irrele-
vant and that the post-purchase functions, by whomever performed,
should not count because they are only ministerial. On this view, once
the transaction closes, the investors do not look to the efforts of others
for their profits because the only variable affecting profits is the timing of
the insured's death, which is outside [Life Partners'] control.
Id. The court justified its acceptance of this argument stating that "post-purchase
entrepreneurial activities are the 'efforts of others' most obviously relevant to the
question whether a promoter is selling a 'security.'" Id. With this quick step and
relatively little explanation of its decision to depart from precedent, the court drew
a bright-line rule, disregarding the promoter's pre-purchase activities, and went on
to the task of distinguishing between significant and insignificant post-purchase
activities. See id. at 545-46.
168. See id. at 545.
169. See id. at 546-48. Adopting Life Partners' argument that pre-purchase
activities, no matter how significant to the success of the enterprise, should be
disregarded, the D.C. Circuit attempted to square its determination with prece-
dent. See id. at 546. The court explained:
[Life Partners'] assertion that its pre-purchase efforts are irrelevant re-
ceives strong, albeit implicit, support for the Ninth Circuit decision in
Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77 ([9th Cir.] 1980) (per curiam). In
that case, which involved investments in silver bars, the court observed
that the promoter made pre-purchase efforts to identify the investment
and to locate prospective investors; offered to store the silver bars at no
charge for a year after purchase and to repurchase them at the published
spot price at any time without charging a brokerage fee.... [T]hese
services were only minimally related to the profitability of the investment
[because] "the profits to the investor depended upon the fluctuations of
the silver market, not the managerial efforts of [the promoter]."
Id. (quoting Noa, 638 F.2d at 79-80). Continuing this line of reasoning, the court
reasoned that the Tenth Circuit's decision in McCown was based on the same prin-
ciple. See id.; see also McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975) (plain-
tiffs alleging that parcels they purchased were securities). The court stated: "In
both Noa and McCown, the courts of appeals regarded the promoter's pre-purchase
efforts as insignificant to the question whether the investments ... were securities."
Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547. Based on its narrow reading of the implicit support
lent by this precedent, the D.C. Circuit drew a bright line completely disregarding
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insignificant to a determination of whether an investment contract consti-
tutes a security.170
After disregarding the pre-purchase efforts of the promoter, the D.C.
Circuit divided the promoter's post-purchase efforts into two classes: en-
trepreneurial efforts and ministerial efforts.1 71 The D.C. Circuit defined
post-purchase ministerial efforts as efforts that are insignificant or inessen-
tial to the success of the investment venture and held that these efforts can
not satisfy the third prong of the Howey test. 172 The court defined post-
purchase entrepreneurial efforts as efforts that are significant or essential
to the success of the investment venture and held that only these efforts
are sufficient to satisfy the third prong of the Howey test.173 After establish-
ing this bright-line rule, the court evaluated Life Partners' efforts to im-
prove the success of the investment contracts it offered and sold to
individual investors. 174
a. Post-purchase Efforts
The court quickly dispensed with the post-purchase efforts under-
taken by Life Partners. 175 Examining the activities Life Partners per-
formed after selling fractional interests in viatical settlements to investors,
any pre-purchase efforts of the investment promoter, no matter how significant
they may be to the success of the enterprise. See id.
170. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546-48.
171. See id. at 545-46.
172. See id. at 545. The court's view that ministerial efforts are insufficient to
satisfy the third prong of the Howey test is consistent with the distinction between
"undeniably significant" promoter efforts and insignificant promoter efforts
adopted in Turner and endorsed in Forman. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters.,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Rather, we adopt a more realistic test,
whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably sig-
nificant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success
of the enterprise."); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975) (stating profits from investment contract are to be derived from "en-
treprenurial or managerial efforts of others"). The distinction between ministerial
effort and entrepreneurial effort was born in Forman, in which the Supreme Court
stated that profits in an investment contract are "to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id.
173. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545-46. The D.C. Circuit cited even less sup-
port for its decision that only post-purchase entrepreneurial efforts are relevant to
a determination of whether an investment contract constitutes a security than it
cited for its determination that pre-purchase efforts, no matter how significant,
should be disregarded from the determination of whether an investment contract
constitutes a security. See id. at 545. In support of this proposition, it cited Interna-
tional Loan Network, Goodman, Koscot and Turner, all of which support the principle
that a promoter's efforts must be significant, but none of which provide support
for the principle that a court should look exclusively at post-purchase efforts when
conducting its examination of relevant factors. See id. (citing SEC v. International
Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Goodman v. Epstein,
582 F.2d 388, 408 n.59 (7th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Turner, 474 F.2d at 482).
174. See id. at 545-48.
175. See id. at 545-47.
956
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the court summarily dismissed all but one of the activities as insignificant,
post-purchase ministerial efforts.
176
The court briefly discussed Life Partners' postpurchase efforts to cre-
ate a secondary market for the fractional interests it offered and sold to
individual investors. 177 The court eventually determined that the offer of
176. See id. at 545-46. The court examined the three versions of viatical settle-
ment investments offered by Life Partners. See id. at 545. The court noted that
[i]n Version I of its program, [Life Partners] and not the investor could
appear as the owner of record of the insurance policy. [Life Partners']
ownership gave it the ability, post-purchase, to change the party desig-
nated as the beneficiary of the policy, indeed to substitute itself as benefi-
ciary. That ability tied the fortunes of the investors more closely to those
of [Life Partners] in the sense that it made the investors dependent upon
[Life Partners] continuing to deal honestly with them, at least to the ex-
tent of not wrongfully dropping them as beneficiaries.
Id. Despite the existence of this necessary trust, the D.C. Circuit observed that this
relationship had no affect on investors' profits. See id. The court further observed
Life Partners' relative inability to affect investors' profits post-purchase. See id. The
court also remarked that "[n]othing that [Life Partners] could do by virtue of its
record ownership had any affect whatsoever upon the near-exclusive determinant
of the investors' rate of return, namely how long the insured survives." Id.
The court was equally unable to find any significant post-purchase efforts in
Version III of Life Partners' investment contracts:
In Version III [Life Partners] provides no post-purchase services. All such
services are the sole responsibility of the investors, who may purchase
them from [a single financial institution closely associated with Life Part-
ners] or not, as they choose. The district court minimized the signifi-
cance of this choice, stating "it is neither realistic nor feasible for multiple
investors, who are strangers to each other, to perform post-purchase tasks
without relying on the knowledge and expertise of a third party [and] the
third party in this case will almost certainly be [the financial institution
closely associated with Life Partners]."
Id. at 546 (quoting SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1995), re-
manded by 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Even accepting the assessment of the
district court, the D.C. Circuit reiterated the prohibitive fact that none of the "post-
purchase services can meaningfully affect the profitability of the investment." Id.
The court therefore reasoned that it does not matter whether or not they are per-
formed by Life Partners or another company. See id.
The court's evaluation of the second version of Life Partners' investment con-
tracts presented different circumstances:
In Version II [Life Partners] no longer appeared as the record owner of a
policy, but [Life Partners] and [its bank] continued to offer the following
post-purchase services: holding the policy, monitoring the insured's
health, paying premiums, converting a group policy into an individual
policy where required, filing the death claim, collecting and distributing
the death benefit [if requested], and assisting an investor who might wish
to resell his interest.
Id. at 545. The classification of these seemingly significant post-purchase services
as insignificant ministerial functions was only questioned by the SEC with regard to
Life Partners' attempt to create a secondary market for the fractional interests in
viatical settlements that it sold to individual investors. See id. Accordingly, this is
the only function that the court singled out for specific discussion. See id. For a
further discussion of Life Partners' attempt to create a secondary market for the
fractional interests in viatical settlements that it sold to retail investors, see supra
note 168 and accompanying text.
177. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546.
1997] 957NOTE
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assistance in liquidating individual investor's interests was insignificant be-
cause investors could get the same help with resale from another viatical
settlement companies there was no evidence in the record that individual
investors actually sought to liquidate their fractional interests in viatical
settlements, Life Partners stopped attempting to create this market, and
Life Partners specifically warned investors that interests in viatical settle-
ments are not liquid assets and that the policies should only be purchased
by those who are willing to hold the contract until the underlying policy
matures. 178 Based on these facts, the court concluded that none of Life
Partners' post-purchase activities were sufficient to satisfy the third prong
of the Howey test.17 9
b. Pre-purchase Efforts
Continuing its evaluation of the Life Partners case in accordance with
the bright-line test it formulated, the D.C. Circuit reiterated the district
court's findings that Life Partners performed substantial pre-purchase ac-
tivities in an effort to insure the success of the investment contracts that it
offered to individual investors.' 80 The court held that these efforts,
178. See id. Acknowledging the SEC's position that Life Partners' attempt to
create a secondary market for the fractional interests in viatical settlements which
it offers is a significant post-purchase activity, the court quickly dismissed the argu-
ment. See id. The court's dismissal of this argument is troubling because it dis-
counts the potential ramifications of Life Partners' actions on the grounds that no
complaints have surfaced and its belief that none are likely to surface. See id. This
view is inconsistent with the broad remedial nature of federal securities laws. See
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (stating that pri-
mary purpose of federal securities laws is to eliminate serious abuses in largely
unregulated market); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (stating that,
when searching for meaning of word "security" under federal securities laws, em-
phasis should be placed on remedial nature of laws); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 301 (noting that statutory policy of securities laws seeks to afford broad
protection to investors); H.R. REP. No. 85, at 11 (1933) (explaining that federal
securities laws were intended, from their first formulation, to be applied to novel
investment schemes falling within conceptual framework of definition of security).
179. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546. After dismissing Life Partners' attempt to
create a secondary market for the fractional shares in viatical settlements that it
marketed to individual investors as insignificant, the D.C. Circuit stated: "In sum,
the SEC has not identified any significant non-ministerial service that [Life Part-
ners] performs for investors once they have purchased their fractional interests in
a viatical settlement. Nor do we find that any of the ministerial functions have a
material impact upon the profits of the investors." Id.
180. See id. at 547. At the initial trial, the district court found Life Partners'
pre-purchase efforts to be significant and considered this evidence weighty, partic-
ularly when viewed in light of the efforts that Life Partners continued to conduct
after the sale of fractional interests in the viatical settlements to individual inves-
tors. See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 14, 22 (D.D.C. 1995), remanded by
87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The trial court commented:
While the Court agrees with [Life Partners] that these post-investment
activities are often ministerial in nature, two factors tip the balance in the
SEC's favor. The first is the pre-investment work by [Life Partners] which
is undeniably essential to the overall success of the investment. The ef-
forts surrounding an investment should be considered in their en-
958 [Vol. 42: p. 925
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though significant to the success of the enterprise, were insignificant to
the determination of whether the investment contracts should be consid-
ered securities.18 ' Accordingly, the court disregarded Life Partners' pre-
purchase efforts, holding that these efforts were not sufficient to satisfy the
third prong of the Howey test.18 2 The court, therefore, concluded that the
tirety.... While investors may be asked for input such as 'the amount
they would like to spend.... T-cell counts, insured's age, insurance com-
pany rating, life expectancy and the like,' they are in fact limited by [Life
Partners'] evaluation of the patient [which takes place pre-purchase].
Moreover, this investor input is of little practical significance as [Life Part-
ners] claims to accept only policies in insurance companies rated 'A-' or
better where the insured has a life expectancy, as determined by [Life
Partners], of less than two years. The mere retention of theoretical rights
of control [in the hands of investors] are of no consequence where the
investor's role is essentially a passive one.
Id. The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's findings that Life Partners'
pre-purchase activities were significant to the success of the enterprise. See Life
Partners, 87 F.3d at 547. The court stated that "[t] he district court appropriately
characterized [Life Partners'] pre-purchase efforts as 'undeniably essential to the
overall success of the investment.'" Id. (quoting Life Partners, 898 F. Supp. at 17).
The court further noted that "[t] he investors rely heavily, if not exclusively, upon
[Life Partners'] to locate insureds and to evaluate them and their policies, as well
as to negotiate an attractive purchase price." Id. (quoting Life Partners, 898 F.
Supp. at 22). The court of appeals, nonetheless, considered these efforts insignifi-
cant to its determination of whether the subject investment contracts constituted
securities for no reason other than the fact that they took place before individual
investors purchased their fractional shares in the viatical settlements. See id. This
decision was premised entirely on the majority's bright-line rule. See id. Noting
the apparent elevation of substance over form promoted by the majority's deci-
sion, and the potential problems this decision presents, the dissent pointed out
that
[t]he net effect of the majority's position is to incorporate a bright-line
rule into Howey's third prong: whatever the surrounding circumstances,
an investment is not a security unless managerial activities by the pro-
moter occur post-purchase. The advantage of this approach is that it of-
fers a clear method for distinguishing between investment contracts that
are securities and investment contracts that are simply investments. But it
does so at a substantial cost. . . . [I]t elevates a formal element, timing,
over the economic reality of the investors' dependence on the promoter.
Even more troubling, the majority's approach undercuts the flexibility
and ability to adapt to 'the countless and variable schemes' that are the
hallmarks of the Howey test.
Id. at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent further stated that
"the third prong of the Howey test can be met by pre-purchase managerial activities
of a promoter when it is the success of these activities, either entirely or predomi-
nantly, that determines whether profits are eventually realized." Id. (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
181. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547.
182. See id. Explaining the factors leading to its determination, the court ob-
served that because the efforts significant to the success of the venture took place
pre-purchase, a finding that the subject investment contracts constituted securities
would provide little benefit to the individual investor. See id. The court noted that
[i]f the investor's profits depend ... predominantly upon the promoter's
efforts, then the investor may benefit from the disclosure and other re-
quirements of federal securities laws. But if the value of the promoter's
efforts has already been impounded into the promoter's fees or into the
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fractional interests in viatical settlements sold by Life Partners do not con-
stitute securities and placed these investment contracts outside the regula-
tory authority of the SEC.183
B. Critical Analysis of the Life Partners Decision
The D.C. Circuit's application of the first two prongs of the Howey test
to the Life Partners case is consistent with precedent. 184 Conversely, the
majority's manipulation and application of the third prong of the Howey
test and its resulting ruling in Life Partners is inconsistent with both prece-
dent and the policy of the Act.18 5 As the dissent points out, the majority's
modification of the Howey test is inappropriate and its resolution of the
question of whether the investment contracts sold by Life Partners consti-
tute securities is incorrect.1
86
The D.C. Circuit's application of the first prong of the Howey test is
consistent with precedent and conforms with the ordinary application of
the profits test.187 Following the application of the first prong of the
purchase price of the investment, and if neither the promoter nor any-
one else is expected to make further efforts that will affect the outcome
of the investment, then the need for federal securities regulation is
greatly diminished.
Id. Observing what it perceived to be the relative irrelevance of federal securities
laws to the specific investment contracts before it, the court drew a bright-line rule
that will affect not only these investment contracts, but all future contracts to come
before the court, some of which may benefit from a less rigid application of the
third prong of the Howey test. See id. at 556.
183. See id. The courtjustified its holding, and its bright-line rule, stating that
.we cannot agree that the time of sale is an artificial dividing line." Id. The court
further stated that "[iut is a legal construct but a significant one." Id. The court
explained its opinion, stating that if the investors' profits depend on the pro-
moter's efforts after purchase of the investment, then the investor may benefit
from the disclosure that would be required by classification of the investment as a
security. See id. The court further observed that, if the value of the promoter's
efforts has already affected the purchase price of the investment, and if neither the
promoter nor anyone else is expected to make further efforts that will affect the
outcome of the investment, then the need for federal securities regulation is
greatly diminished. See id. Therefore, in cases such as Life Partners, in which the
promoter performs significant pre-purchase activities and only ministerial post-
purchase services, the third prong of the Howey test is not satisfied under the D.C.
Circuit's new bright-line approach. See id. Accordingly, because the court drew a
bright-line rule, disregarding Life Partners' pre-purchase efforts to improve the
success of investments offered and sold to individual investors, and because the
court likewise wholly disregarded Life Partners' ministerial post-purchase activities,
the D.C. Circuit held that the investment contracts offered to individual retail in-
vestors by Life Partners failed the Howey test and were not securities within the
definition of the Act. See id.
184. Id. at 542-45 (discussing first two prongs of Howey test).
185. Id. at 545-48 (discussing application of third prong of Howey test.)
186. See id. at 549 (Wald, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority on applica-
tion of first two prongs of Howey test but disagreeing with majority on application
of third prong of test).
187. See id. at 542-43 (applying first prong of Howey test to facts of Life Part-
ners). Summarizing relevant precedent, the D.C. Circuit coherently enunciated
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Howey test in Joiner, Tcherepnin and Forman, the D.C. Circuit determined
that the fractional interest in viatical settlements purchased by individual
investors were purchased for the purpose of obtaining a financial return
on the money they invested.1 88 The court determined that the financial
profit motivation of the investors satisfied the first prong of the Howey
test.1 8 9 This determination is consistent with the Supreme Court's prior
determinations of this issue.1 90
Likewise, the D.C. Circuit's application of the second prong of the
Howey test is consistent with the Supreme Court's and other circuits' appli-
cation of this test.191 The court applied the horizontal commonality crite-
ria to the facts of Life Partners and systematically determined that pooling
the profit test that makes up the first prong of the test. See id. at 542. The D.C.
Circuit's statement of the profits prong of the Howey test conforms with the ordi-
nary usage of the test. Id.
The traditional application of the profits test is demonstrated in Joiner and
Tcherepnin, which together represent the Supreme Court's view that profits, for
purposes of the first prong of the Howey test, include capital appreciation, or
growth of an individuals' original investment capital and dividends, income or a
participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds. See Tcher-
epnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967) (noting that petitioner could expect
profit from participation in common enterprise); SEC v. C.M. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344,
349 (1943) ("It is clear that an economic interest in this well-drilling undertaking
was what brought into being the investment that defendants were selling and gave
to the instruments most of their value and all of their lure."). By contrast, profits,
for purposes of the Howey test, do not include, as this court observes and the
Supreme Court stated in Forman, a purchase motivated by a desire to use, occupy
or consume the item purchased. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 852-53 (1975) ("By contrast, when a purchaser is motivated by a desire to
use or consume the item purchased ... the securities laws do not apply.").
188. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 542.
189. See id. at 543.
190. For further explanation of the court's application of the profits prong of
the Howey test to the facts of Life Partners, see supra notes 151-59 and accompanying
text.
191. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 543-45. The court's failure to specifically ad-
dress the issue of whether or not an enterprise existed is not inconsistent with
precedent. See id. at 544; see also Rodriguez v. Banco Centr. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 11
(1st Cir. 1993) (addressing directly and independently issue of whether common
enterprise exists). This issue is consistently ignored when courts feel it is obvious
that an enterprise exists. This issue is also commonly addressed in a court's evalua-
tion of the third prong of the Howey test, as the Life Partners court did. Life Partners,
87 F.3d at 548.
The D.C. Circuit's evaluation of the enterprise portion of the second prong of
the Howey test is analogous to the evaluation undertaken by the Supreme Court in
Forman. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 859; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 544-45. In both cases,
the Life Partners court and the Forman Court reserved the issue in order to address
it while evaluating the third prong of the test. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 859; Life
Partners, 87 F.3d at 544-45. Moreover, the issue was summarily dismissed in less
than one sentence in each case. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 859; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at
544-45. Though seemingly cavalier and haphazard, this treatment is consistent
with many courts' failure or reluctance to accord this factor significant weight,
unless an enterprise is conspicuously absent from the subject investment contract.
See Forman, 421 U.S. at 859; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 544-45. When the existence of
an enterprise is conspicuously absent from the investment contract, this factor typi-
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of funds, sharing of profit and sharing of loss were all characteristics of the
subject investment contracts.1 92 The court, therefore, determined that
horizontal commonality of interest was present among investors in Life
Partners' investment contracts. 193 Reaching this determination, and ac-
knowledging that a finding of horizontal commonality alone is normally
sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the Howey test, the court reserved
judgment on the issue of whether a common enterprise existed for evalua-
tion within its application of the third prong of the Howey test.
19 4
The third prong of the Howey test requires profits to be derived from
the efforts of others.195 Applying this prong, the D.C. Circuit adhered to
the Ninth Circuit's practical interpretation announced in Turner and read
out the "solely" requirement.1 9 6 At this juncture, however, the majority
departed from both the Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts of
appeals' interpretation of the third prong of the Howey test.
197
The majority's departure from precedent begins at the Turner and
Koscot courts' recognition that efforts giving rise to profits must be "unde-
niably significant" to satisfy the Howey test.198 Seizing on this principle and
relying on what it characterized as "implicit support" from the Ninth Cir-
cally receives independent treatment and is accorded much greater weight. See
Foman, 421 U.S. at 859; Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 544-45.
192. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 543-44. In reaching its conclusion, the court enu-
merated Life Partners' bringing together of individual investors, aggregation of
their funds, the fact that investors experience a profit or loss simultaneously and
the interdependency of the investors that "transforms the transaction substantively
into a pooled investment." Id. at 544.
193. See id. at 544. In sum, the court stated, "we .conclude that all three ele-
ments of horizontal commonality-pooling, profit sharing, and loss sharing-at-
tend the purchase of a fractional interest through [Life Partners]." Id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.; see also SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir. 1973) (eliminating requirement that investor profits derive "solely" from
efforts of others in favor of requirment that investor profits derive "predomi-
nantly" from efforts of others and efforts of those others must be "undeniably sig-
nificant" to success of common enterprise).
197. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545. For a discussion of the new bright-line
rule introduced into the third prong of the Howey test by the Life Partners court, see
supra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
198. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545; see also SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (adding "undeniably significant" language to
interpretation of Howey test); Turner, 474 F.2d at 482 (same). Grounding its depar-
ture from precedent, the court relies heavily on the "undeniably significant" efforts
standard established in Turner and Koscot. For a discussion of this standard, see
supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
From its departure point, the Life Partners court hinted at its rationale for forg-
ing a new standard by stating that "post-purchase entrepreneurial activities are the
'efforts of others' most obviously relevant to the question whether a promoter is
selling a 'security."' Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 545. The court then proceeded to
draw its bright line by explaining that only the significant post-purchase efforts of a
promoter are sufficient to satisfy the third prong of the Howey test, and no other
efforts will suffice. See id. Pointing to flaws in the majority's rationale, the dissent
argued that this standard imposed an artificial and impractical formality, which is
962
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cuit in Noa and the Tenth Circuit in McCown, the majority took the princi-
ple of Turner and Koscot one step further by drawing a bright line between
what it described as pre-purchase efforts and post-purchase efforts of the
promoter. 199
The bright line drawn by the majority provides an easily administered
method of distinguishing between investment contracts that do and do
not satisfy the third prong of the Howey test.200 Under this approach, if
the promoter's efforts take place before the investment contract is sold to
an individual investor, then the investment contract is not a security. 20 1
Conversely, if the promoter's efforts take place after the investment is sold
to individual investors and the promoter's efforts are "undeniably signifi-
cant," only then does the investment contract constitute a security. 20 2
This new test enabled the majority in Life Partners to reduce the reso-
lution of this case to a formalistic application of a static standard.2 0 3 This
new bright-line test enabled the court to dispose of the Life Partners deci-
sion and, potentially, many securities cases to come in the future, with
relative ease. 20 4 Unfortunately, as the dissent points out, this quick and
easy method lacks the solid support of precedent and operates contrary to
the expressed intent of Congress in promulgating the Act.20 5
The Life Partners dissent points out multiple irreconcilable differences
between Supreme Court precedent and traditional applications of the
Howey test and the majority's application of the third prong of the Howey
test in Life Partners.20 6 The Supreme Court has steadily maintained its po-
sition, originally taken in Howey, that securities laws should be applied flex-
ibly.20 7  This position echoes the express intent of Congress in
promulgating the Act, that the Act should be construed broadly, taking
contrary to the flexible nature of the traditional evaluation, upon the Howey test.
See id. at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting).
199. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546. For a discussion of the court's reliance on
McCown and Noa, see supra note 169 and accompanying text.
200. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting). The dissent acknowl-
edges the ease with which this test can be administered; however, it also points out
that this ease of administration comes at the "substantial cost" of elevating form
over substance, contrary to the expressed intent of the Supreme Court in Howey.
See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 547.
202. Id. at 546-47.
203. Id. at 551 (Wald, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
205. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
207. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (ap-
plying Act flexibly because of need to eliminate serious abuses of unregulated
abuse prior to enactment of federal securities laws). For a further discussion of the
court's evaluation of pre-purchase efforts of an investment promoter and the im-
pact of pre-purchase efforts on the overall success of a common enterprise, see
supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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into account novel schemes. 20 8 Though the third prong of the Howey test
has been altered since its inception in 1946, courts have never held that
the existence of only pre-purchase activities is insufficient to satisfy this
prong.20 9
The cases that the majority cites as providing implicit support for this
position do not clearly or entirely support this principle.2 10 In McCown,
the Tenth Circuit took the substantial pre-purchase efforts undertaken by
the promoter into account.211 The court held that these efforts, coupled
with the existence of a promise to perform post-purchase entrepreneurial
efforts, transformed the sale of subdivided lots into the sale of investment
contracts constituting securities.2 1 2 The court did not state that the pre-
purchase efforts were irrelevant, nor did it state that the post-purchase
efforts alone were sufficient to classify these investments as securities.
21 3
In Noa, the Ninth Circuit held that the subject investment contracts
did not satisfy the third prong of the Howey test because the investors'
profits depended entirely upon external market forces beyond the control
or influence of the promoter. 214 The investors' profits depended exclu-
sively on fluctuations of the silver market.2 1 5 Purchase, delivery and stor-
208. See SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295-300 (1946) (applying Act to
offering of fractional land interests in citrus grove development coupled with con-
tract for cultivating, marketing and remitting portion of net proceeds to individual
retail investor).
209. See id. (reasoning that pre-purchase activities alone are sufficient to class-
ify transaction as investment contract within definition of security pursuant to Act).
210. See Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79-80 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (explaining that court's determination that investments in silver bars are
not securities because success of investment is entirely dependent upon market
fluctuations); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 209 (10th Cir. 1975) (identifying
pre- and post-purchase efforts of promoter as significant to success of enterprise
and determination that investment contracts constitute securities).
211. McCown, 527 F.2d at 209.
212. See id. Citing the holding in McCown, the majority in Life Partners at-
tempts to find support for its exclusion of pre-purchase efforts of the promoter.
See SEC v. Life.Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing McCown,
527 F.2d at 209). The Life Partners court explained: "'[W]ithout the substantial
improvements pledged by [the promoters] the lots would not have a value consis-
tent with the price which purchasers paid .... The utilization of purchase money
... to build the promised improvements' could bring the scheme within the pur-
view of the securities laws." Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547 (quoting McCown, 527 F.2d
at 211). Prior to this statement, the McCown court discussed the pre-purchase ef-
forts at length, leading to the conclusion that the pre- and-post-purchase efforts of
the promoter combined led to the determination that these investment contracts
could be securities. McCown, 527 F.2d at 209-11. This examination leads to the
possible conclusion that the majority has taken the statements from McCown, from
which it draws implicit support of its exclusion of pre-purchase efforts, out of con-
text. See Lfe Partners, 87 F.3d at 547. For a further discussion of the pre-purchase
efforts discussed in McCown, see supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
213. See McCown, 527 F.2d at 209-11.
214. Noa, 638 F.2d at 79 (explaining that investors' returns depended upon
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age of a specified amount and quality of silver did not rise to the level of
"undeniably significant" efforts affecting the profitability of the investors'
endeavor. 2 16 Similar to McCown, the Ninth Circuit did not hinge its deter-
mination that the subject contracts did not constitute securities on the
existence of only pre-purchase efforts, rather the court looked directly at
the impact of the promotor's efforts on the success of the common enter-
prise.217 Unlike Life Partners, neither the Noa court nor the McCown court
drew the time-of-purchase distinction.2 18
Judge Wald's dissent in Life Partners parts company with the majority
on only the application of the third prong of the Howey test.21 9 Instead of
the majority's bright-line approach, the dissent proposes a flexible ap-
proach to the third prong of the Howey test.220 The dissent's proposed
method of applying the third prong of the Howey test is consistent with the
precedent cited for implicit support by the majority.22 1 This approach
maintains the congressionally mandated policy of applying federal securi-
ties laws in a flexible manner, so as to enable their application to innova-
tive and novel schemes. 22 2 The dissent's proposed approach would
eliminate the majority's bright-line rule and refocus the inquiry on the
economic realities surrounding the impact of the promoter's efforts on
216. See id. at 80.
217. See id. For a further discussion of the factors leading to the court's deter-
mination that the investment contracts in Noa did not constitute securities, see
supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
218. Noa, 638 F.2d at 80; McCown, 527 F.2d at 209.
219. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 549-53 (Wald, J., dissenting).
220. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting). Instead of imposing a bright-line rule
where one has never previously existed, the dissent suggested a flexible approach
to the third prong of the Howey test that would "focus on the kind and degree of
dependence between the investors' profits and the promoter's activities." Id. at
551 (Wald, J., dissenting).
221. See Noa, 638 F.2d at 79-80 (explaining court's determination that invest-
ments in silver bars are not securities because success of investment is entirely de-
pendent upon market fluctuations); McCown, 527 F.2d at 209 (recognizing
combination of pre- and post-purchase efforts of promoter as significant to deter-
mination that investment contracts constitute securities).
222. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 552 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald at-
tempted to stick closely to the intent of the Supreme Court and Congress. See id.
(Wal'l, J., dissenting). Judge Wald wrote:
The reason I focus on the degree of dependence between the investors'
profits and the promoter's activities is twofold. First, I believe that this
focus is more in keeping with the tenor of the Supreme Court's opinions
applying Howey and its concern that regulation be tied to underlying eco-
nomic reality instead of form.
Id. (Wald, J., dissenting); see SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946)
(explaining federal securities laws should be applied flexibly to encompass novel
schemes and investment instruments normally considered securities); SEC v. C.M.
Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 354 (1943) (recognizing judicial precedent and legislative
intent clearly indicating that federal securities laws are to be construed and ap-
plied flexibly and broadly); H.R. REP. No. 85, at 11 (1933) (stating federal securi-
ties laws should be applied liberally to all instruments that take form of securities
or appear to be securities).
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each transaction. 223 First, in keeping with the standards of McCown and
Noa, under the dissent's approach any "undeniably significant" efforts of
the promoter, whether they occur pre- or post-purchase, could satisfy the
third prong of the Howey test.224 Second, the dissent would also institu-
tionalize the approach employed in Noa.22 5 This approach would distin-
guish between profits realized from the promoter's efforts and profits
realized from the operation of external market forces. 2 26 Any significant
efforts of the promoter that directly or indirectly have an undeniably sig-
nificant impact on the success of the venture could satisfy the Howey
test.2 2 7 External market forces that impact the success of the venture
could not satisfy the third prong of the Howey test.228
Like the majority, the Life Partners dissent proposes a new approach to
the third prong of the Howey test.229 Unlike the majority, Judge Wald's
dissent proposes a flexible test that draws directly, not implicitly, on the
position of the Supreme Court and federal appellate court precedent.230
The majority and the dissent rely on the same precedent for support. 23 1
The question of whether either of these approaches will become the defin-
itive factor in the third prong of the Howey test, and if so, how either will
affect the test, remains unanswered. 232
The Life Partners decision will dramatically affect the future applica-
tion of the Howey test and the regulation of viatical settlements. Life Part-
ners places the application of the third prong of the Howey test in a state of
223. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 552 (Wald, J., dissenting).
224. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
225. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting); see also Noa, 638 F.2d at 79-80 (noting that
success or failure of ventures dependent upon efforts of promoter satisfies third
prong of Howey test, profits realized from fluctuation of the market, beyond con-
trol of promoter do not satisfy third prong of Howey test).
226. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 552 (Wald, J. dissenting).
227. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
228. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald explains that
distinguishing between profits realized from the promoter's activities and
profits realized from the operation of market forces coheres with the be-
lief that investors are protected by access to information. When profits
depend on the intervention of market forces, there will be public infor-
mation available to an investor by which the investor could assess the like-
lihood of an investment's success. Moreover, where profits depend on
the operation of market forces "registration . . . could provide no data
about the seller which would be relevant to those market risks."
Id. (Wald, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc.,
678 F.2d 649, 652 (6th Cir. 1982)).
229. Id. at 549-52 (Wald, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at 549 (Wald, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of support
that precedent relied upon by majority provides to dissent's rationale and opinion,
see supra notes 210-28 and accompanying text.
231. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 546. For a discussion of the majority's reliance
on precedent for implicit support, see supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
232. For a discussion of the dissent's reliance on precedent, see supra notes
210-20 and accompanying text.
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flux, particularly within the D.C. Circuit.233 It is unclear whether the
bright-line test introduced into the third prong ofthe Howey test by the
D.C. Circuit in Life Partners will achieve the Supreme Court's and SEC's
policy objectives. 234 At first glance, the test appears to present a hole
through which many investment schemes could escape merely by virtue of
the promoters performing all efforts that are significant to the success of
the investment before selling the investment to individual retail inves-
tors.23 5 If this were the result of the application of the bright-line rule
introduced by the D.C. Circuit, it would be directly at odds with the policy
underlying Howey and the expressed intent of the Congress in promulgat-
ing federal securities laws.236 If the Life Partners decision leads to a clash
between the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, it appears likely the
D.C. Circuit's alteration of the third prong of the Howey test will be erased
and a new test formulated. 237
VI. CONCLUSION
The Life Partners decision placed the fractional interest in viatical set-
tlements, sold by Life Partners to individual retail investors, outside the
regulatory authority of the SEC.23 8 This decision has no immediate practi-
cal affect upon sale of these interests. 239 These transactions will most
likely continue in the manner in which they have been conducted for the
foreseeable future. As a result of this decision, however, these transactions
will go unregulated unless individual states step in and promulgate regula-
tions governing these investment vehicles.
The prospect of individual state regulation of viatical settlements is
highly realistic. 240 Nine states have already taken steps aimed at imple-
233. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 550 (Wald, J., dissenting) (pointing out that ma-
jority has drawn bright-line rule where one has previously never existed and that
this development will undoubtedly affect application of Howey test).
234. Id. at 552 (Wald, J., dissenting). The dissent points out that the major-
ity's approach risks introducing inflexibility into the test which will allow invest-
ment schemes that are securities in form to escape regulation by the SEC merely
by performing all significant efforts before selling the investment to individual in-
vestors and performing only insignificant efforts after selling the investment to
individual investors. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
235. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
236. See id. (Wald, J., dissenting); see also SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301
(1946) (explaining that federal securities laws should be applied broadly and
flexibly).
237. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547.
238. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) (establishing and ex-
plaining scope of SEC's jurisdiction over primary issues of securities).
239. As a result of the decision in Life Partners, the previously issued and en-
forced injunction prohibiting Life Partners from marketing and selling fractional
shares of viatical settlements to individual investors was lifted, and Life Partners
was allowed to resume its business. Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 547.
240. See Stone, supra note 1, at NI (explaining that, between 1988 and 1992,
at least three states took steps to regulate viatical settlements industry).
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menting such regulations.2 4 1 These regulations typically provide a great
measure of protection for the terminally-ill insured who wish to enter into
a viatical settlement. 242 Conversely, these highly protective regulations
provide no protection whatsoever for individuals purchasing fractional
shares of viatical settlements from investment companies offering these
investment contracts. 243 Thus, the decision in Life Partners and the regula-
tions undertaken by the states ignore the huge potential for the perpetra-
tion of fraud upon unsophisticated individual investors by companies
engaged in the largely unregulated, multimillion-dollar viatical settlement
industry.
The viatical settlement industry welcomed the Life Partners decision as
a giant step toward legitimizing the industry.24 4 Unfortunately for inves-
tors, this decision represents a major set back for consumer protection
from the tremendous potential for abuse and fraud that exists in this
booming financial services industry.
The Life Partners decision placed the mantle of consumer protection
from the many possible abuses in this industry on the shoulders of state
regulatory agencies. Time will tell whether the states are able and willing
to take up this burden and provide individual investors with adequate pro-
tection. Additionally, time will tell whether the Supreme Court will reject
the D.C. Circuit's bright-line modification of the Howey test, potentially
enabling the SEC to regulate the sale of fractional interests in viatical set-
tlements sometime in the future.
Michael R. Davis
241. See id. (explaining that, in 1992, California had 12 companies that had
applied for licenses under state viatical settlement regulation laws).
242. See Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 541. The Model Viatical Settlement Act,
drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, provides protec-
tion for insureds who sell their life insurance policies to viatical settlement compa-
nies; however, the Model Act and statutes actually enacted by several states provide
no protection whatsoever for individual investors purchasing fractional shares of
viatical settlements from viatical settlement companies. See id.; see also VIATICAL
SET-rLEMENTS MODEL AcT (National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Proposed Official Draft
1995).
243. For a discussion of the possible loophole created by the Life Partners deci-
sion, see supra note 234-35 and accompanying text.
244. See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at COI. Asked about the Life Partners deci-
sion, John Banks, chief executive officer of Viaticus, Inc., a large viatical settlement
division of one of the nation's largest insurance companies, stated that "in the long
term [the decision] legitimizes the industry more than ever, and it will make it...
even easier for companies to raise money through conventional channels such as
bank loans and stock offerings." Id.
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